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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to discuss the history of civil rights and executive 
order legislation with regard to public sector employment. The research questions 
addressed included: "When does an employer have the right to practice affirmative action 
in awarding preferential treatment in hiring and promotions?"; "Are prospective 
employers being discriminatory if they reqmre prospective employees to take an 
examination, even though there is evidence that minorities usually score 
disproportionately lower than their white colleagues?"; and "Are termination policies 
based upon seniority acceptable, if the majority of the senior employees are non minority 
males?" 
The major legal themes of sixteen federal cases were identified regarding public 
sector affirmative action policy development. Criteria necessary for analyzing the 
constitutionality of affirmative action policies with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection Clause and Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1964 was formulated for 
applicability within state, local, and federal agencies. 
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non-minority males? The answers to these questions m addition to other insight 1s 
provided throughout this report. 
Organization of Study 
The study is divided into primary and secondary sections. The first chapter 
discusses the organization and research design of the study. The second chapter analyzes 
affirmative action programs from an historical perspective. It traces the Progressive 
movement of the mid 60s during the enactment of key civil rights legislation to the recent 
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The third chapter discusses the two major 
themes common throughout sixteen federal cases with regard to the implementation and 
validity of affirmative action programs in public sector employment. The third chapter 
also summarizes the findings of the sixteen federal cases with regard to answering the 
questions concerning the issue of when does an employer have the right to legally 
practice affirmative action in awarding preferential treatment in making employment 
considerations regarding hiring and promotions?; are prospective employers being 
discriminatory if they require prospective employees to take an examination, even though 
there is evidence to support the fact that minorities usually score disproportionately lower 
than their white colleagues?; and are termination policies based upon seniority 
acceptable, if the predominant majority of the senior employees are non-minority males? 
The third chapter also summarizes the findings of the sixteen federal cases with regard to 
allegations of Equal Protection and Title VII violations. The fourth chapter discusses the 
conclusion and findings of the study. 
3 
Research Design 
The study was conducted by utilizing both primary and secondary sources. The 
primary sources used were actual case statutes. The secondary sources used were law 
journals, publications, and computer databases. Initially, the search began by accessing 
the legal Lexis/Nexis database to acquire information regarding locating court cases 
pertaining to affirmative action. After finding the court citations, the cases were used to 
gain insight into locating constitutional issues that were common throughout the cases. 
Upon gaining this information, the United States Code Annotated was consulted to find 
the actual language of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Next, the Loyola University Information Service (LUIS) 
database was accessed to gain additional information regarding locating legal journals 
and periodicals specifically related to affirmative action in public sector employment. 
The LUIS database provided a menu that supplied pertinent information and access 
capabilities to the Loyola Law (LLA W) database, which indices the legal periodicals 
covering criminal justice, law, and public policy issues. The 4 General Index (INDY) 
database, which provides an index to major scholarly business, humanities, social 
sciences, and science journals. Finally, the ProQuest Periodical Abstracts - Research I 
database was used to access other scholarly journals related to the issue of affirmative 
action. All of this information was combined and incorporated to provide the substance 
and factual basis of this report. 
The sources were used to answer pertinent questions regarding legally 
sanctioned preferential treatment and racial classification used m employment 
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considerations, under the auspices of an employer's affirmative action plan. The research 
questions addressed included: when does an employer have the right to practice 
affirmative action in awarding preferential treatment when making employment 
considerations regarding in hiring and promotions?; are prospective employers being 
discriminatory if they require prospective employees to take an examination, even though 
there is evidence to support the fact that minorities usually score disproportionately lower 
than their white colleagues?; and are termination policies based upon seniority 
acceptable, ifthe predominant majority of the senior employees are non-minority males? 
The two major legal themes of sixteen federal court cases were identified and 
discussed regarding public sector affirmative action policy development. Criteria 
necessary for analyzing the constitutionality of affirmative action policies with respect to 
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Title VII Civil Rights Act of 
1964 was formulated for applicability within state, local, and federal agencies. All of the 
source material was incorporated into this report to provide substantial insight into 
tracing the history and application of affirmative action programs in public sector 
employment. 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
1. Affirmative Action refers to specific steps, beyond terminating 
discriminatory practices, that are taken to promote equal opportunity and ensuring that 
discrimination does not reoccur in the workplace. 1 
1Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and 
Ethics," The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991, 11. 
5 
2. Affirmative Action Employer refers to an employer that gives 
preferential treatment to members of a protected class of individuals, 1.e. women, 
minorities, veterans, and disabled persons. 2 
3. Affirmative Action in Employment includes hiring and promoting 
protected class members on the basis of a formal affirmative action plan. The 
affirmative action plan is based upon proposed timetables and goals that have been 
established via aid of a utilization analysis of an organization's work force. 3 
4. Affirmative Action Goals refers to the elimination of non legal barriers 
in order to grant equal employment opportunities, including intentional discriminatory 
practices and non intentional, structural or systemic discrimination. 4 
5. Discrimination refers to an illegal or impermissible employment 
decision, practice or policy that takes into consideration one of the statutorily prohibited 
factors, e.g., race or gender under Title VII or age under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), or discrimination not considered job related and resulting in a 
disparate impact on members of a protected class.5 
2Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and 
Ethics," 23. 
3Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and 
Ethics," 24. 
4Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and 
Ethics,'' 11. 
5John A Gray, "Preferential Affirmative Action in Employment,'' Labor Law 
Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1, January 1992, 25. 
6 
6. Equal Employment Opportunity refers to the legal obligations of 
statutorily mandated employers not to "discriminate" against members of a protected 
l 6 c ass. 
7. Equal Opportunity Principle refers to all people being given the right to 
equal access to whatever goods and services are needed to develop their natural talents, 
so that persons with equal natural talents have equal opportunities and resources to 
develop their talents and become competitive in a market economy. 7 
8. Ethical Distinction refers to the differentiation made between an 
organization's obligation to comply with established conduct standards and the aspiration 
to meet the goals of affirmative action plans. 8 
9. Ethical Question refers to the likelihood of particular legislation that 
was unethical, however legal, prior to the enactment of Civil Rights Act of 1964. This 
includes any legislation that denies opportunities to anyone solely based upon that 
person's racial persuasion. On the other side, the ethical question asks on what grounds is 
it ethical to deny employment to a qualified individual by granting employment or 
promotions on a competitive basis, simply because there is under representation by 
members of a protected class of individuals in a particular area or organization? 9 
6John A. Gray, "Preferential Affirmative Action in Employment," Labor Law 
Journal, 25. 
7Rayrnond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and 
Ethics," 11. 
8 Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and 
Ethics," 25 
7 
10. Mandatory Affirmative Action refers to affirmative action required by 
federal and state laws. 10 
11. Mandatory Affirmative Action Requirement requires that an employer 
implement an affirmative action plan and make a good faith effort of implementation. 11 
12. Merit Principal refers to the preferential jobs and rewards that should 
be distributed on a meritorial basis in a social context characterized by equality of 
. 12 opportumty. 
13. Minority Business Enterprises refers to the inclusion of any business in 
the country which is owned and employed by at least 51 % of a minority group 
representation that includes African Americans, Eskimos, Spanish-speaking, Indian, 
Oriental, or Aleut Citizens. 13 
14. Preferential Affirmative Action refers to any type of preferential 
treatment, albeit informal or formal, where an employment opportunity is given solely 
based upon a person's race, gender, veteran status, or disability. For example, choosing 
9Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and 
Ethics," 24. 
10Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and 
Ethics," 24. 
11Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and 
Ethics," 25. 
12Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and 
Ethics," 7. 
13 City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) at 469. 
8 
one applicant over another because the selected candidate is a minority, Vietnam veteran, 
female, or handicapped. 14 
15. Pure Equality of Opportunity refers to the equal legal access combined 
with an uncompromising adherence to the idea that the best qualified individual should 
always be hired by employers. 15 
16. Remedial Affirmative Action refers to an employers efforts to assure 
equality of access to all employment opportunities for all qualified individuals, 
particularly the protected classes of people who have been traditionally overlooked or 
denied access to employment activities. This action is achieved by targeting recruiting 
activities or providing remedial training programs to minorities and other members of the 
protected classes. 16 
17. Reverse Discrimination refers to affirmative action that unfairly 
discriminates against a non-minority group by going beyond the limits prescribed by 
1 17 aw. 
18. Set Asides refers to programs in which a certain percentage of 
governmental contracts are awarded to women and minority owned businesses. 18 
14Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and 
Ethics," 23. 
15Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and 
Ethics," 11. 
16Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and 
Ethics," 23. 
17Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and 
Ethics," 24. 
9 
19. Target Groups refers to classifications of people that are identified as 
having been negatively affected by discrimination, and therefore targeted for concern by 
affirmative action programs. This group includes any discrimination practices based 
upon race, color, sex, religion, and alienage. 19 
20. Utilization Analysis contrasts the racial and gender composition of an 
organization's work force, at all levels, with that of the qualified labor pool reasonably 
available to fill those positions. For example, if the percentage of minorities and women 
in the employer's work force is lower than that in the available labor pool, then there is a 
work force imbalance. 20 
21. Voluntary Affirmative Action refers to action plans that are voluntarily 
designed by individual organizations and meet federal and/or state regulations. 21 
The following chapter discusses the history of legislation and executive orders 
leading to affirmative action policies and programs. The third chapter provides an 
analysis of major themes of supreme court affirmative action legislation. The fourth 
chapter is the concluding chapter and discusses the findings of the study. 
18David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, Vol. 5, No. 198, April 15, 1994, 22. 
19David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 12. 
20David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 24. 
21 David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 24. 
CHAPTER2 
HISTORY OF LEGISLATION AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS LEADING 
TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 deals specifically with contracts. 1 The Act states: 
All persons ... shall have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... 
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
persons and property as is enjoyed by white persons. 2 
The Act was proceeded by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which 
was ratified in 1868. Section 1 of the act guarantees to all citizens, "equal protection 
under the law, due process of all laws, and the right to life, liberty, and property. "3 
1Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981-82 (1970). 
2Bron Raymond Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and 
Ethics," The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991, 19. 




Executive Order 10,925 
Executive Order 10,925 was issued on June 9, 1961 in response to the final 
report of the Committee on Government Contracts to President Eisenhower, which was 
chaired by then Vice President Nixon. The report concluded that: 
(1) Overt discrimination in the sense that an employer actually refuses to 
hire solely because of race, religion, color or national origin is not as prevalent as is 
generally believed. To a greater degree, the indifference of employers to 
establishing a positive policy of non-discrimination hinders qualified applicants 
and employers from being hired and promoted on the basis of equality. 
The direct result of such indifference is that schools, training institutions, 
recruitment and referral sources follow the pattern set by industry. Employment 
sources do not normally supply job applicants regardless of race, color, religion, or 
national origin unless asked to do so by employers. Schools and other training 
sources frequently cannot fill non-discriminatory job orders from employers 
because training may take from one to six years or more . 
... (2) There is no justification for discrimination in employment because of 
race, color, religion, or national origin in work performed by contractors paid by 
federal funds .... 1 
The implications of the report regarding affirmative action seem to suggest that 
the patterns of historical racism and/or sexism prevalent in Corporate American 
institutions were advised to become less overt with absence of malice. Nixon's report 
emphasized that "indifference is hardly responsive to prohibitions that speak to 
intentional, malicious, misconduct." 2 The executive order also gave the President's 
1James Jones, Jr., "The Origins of Affirmative Action," University of Davis Law 
Review, Vol. 21, No. 2, Winter 1988, 395. 
2James Jones, Jr., "The Origins of Affirmative Action," University of Davis Law 
Review, 396. 
12 
Committee authority to adopt rules and regulations and issue orders deemed appropriate 
and necessary to achieve the purposes of the order. 
Origina11y, the program focused on the complaint process and voluntary 
accommodations. Executive Order 10,925 spawned the Plans for Progress Program. The 
Plans for Progress Program was enacted in response to the NAACP's announcement of its 
intentions to file a complaint against a federal contract granted to the Lockheed 
Corporation, which at the time was the second largest U.S. defense contractor. In order 
to avert the negative publicity, Lockheed in conjunction with the government agreed to 
make sweeping reforms and to act as the prototype for voluntary affirmative action plans. 
In response to the threat and possible enforcement of the suit, other companies consulted 
with committee representatives to develop voluntary affirmative action programs. The 
plans were far reaching in scope, committing the companies to anti discrimination 
practices in all aspects of human resources and development. Companies were required 
to confirm their intentions to take positive action to recruit and maintain minority 
employment, with special emphasis on training, educational development, and 
promotions. Companies were required to make pledges regarding the development of 
equal opportunity policies and recruitment sources, create detailed plans on the 
implementation of the proposals, and produce progress reports regularly to the President's 
Committee. The Plans for Progress Program was responsible for increasing minority 
representation in the total work force from 5. 1 % to 5. 7%. The total African American 
13 
representation doubled. However, the representation was less than 1 % among all of the 
companies participating in the program. 3 
Executive Order 10,925 required certain contractors to take "affirmative action" 
procedures to ensure that people did not suffer discrimination due to their race, creed, 
color, or national origin. Initially, this executive order pertained strictly to recruiting, 
initiating practices to eliminate prejudicial attitudes, and eliminating practices that could 
pose as barriers to the fair treatment of protected class members. 4 This was in contrast to 
previous efforts to ensure the enactment of civil rights measures. Prior to the enactment 
of this order, protective measures prohibited certain conduct based on a perceived 
undesirable status such as race, religion, sex, or national origin. This order stipulated 
that recipients of federal government contracts be required to eliminate past vestiges of 
racial discrimination by taking steps towards implementing affirmative action programs 
and prohibiting any form of discrimination based upon a person's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. 5 
3James Jones, Jr., "The Origins of Affirmative Action," University of Davis Law 
Review, 396-97. 
4Robert K. Robinson, John Seydel, and Hugh J. Sloan, "Reverse Discrimination 
Employment Litigation: Defining the Limits of Preferential Promotion," Labor Law 
Journal, Vol. 46, No. 3, March 1995, 132. 
5Leslie A. Nay and James E. Jones, Jr., "Equal Employment and Affirmative 
Action in Local Governments: A Profile," Law and Inequality, A Journal of Theory and 
Practice, The University of Minnesota Law School, Vol. VIII, No. 1, November 1989, 
104. 
14 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 
President Lyndon Johnson said, "You do not wipe away the scars of centuries by 
saying: Now you are free to do as you desire ... you do not take a person who, for years 
has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him to the starting line of a race and 
then say, you are free to compete with all of the others." 6 This speech was given in 1965 
by President Johnson at Howard University, a prestigious African American college. It is 
thought that this speech fueled the fire and initiated the fervor associated with affirmative 
action and civil rights legislation. Civil rights legislation provided the incentive to enact 
affirmative action programs designed to eliminate the vestiges of past racial 
discrimination practices imposed upon African Americans initially, and then 
incorporated to include all minorities and women. 
During the 1960s, President Johnson's Civil Rights Act of 1964 legally 
prohibited racial discrimination in public education and employment. In 1965, the 
Voting Rights Act ended years of depriving Southern African Americans from exercising 
their right to vote in public elections. The Federal Housing Act of 1968 ensured that all 
people received public access and accommodation regardless of race or ethnicity. 
Theoretically, all of these advances towards eliminating past vestiges of racial/ethnic and 
gender discrimination practices with regard to voting, public accommodation access, 
public education and employment were eliminated with the passages of the above 
6David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, Vol. 5, No. 198, April 15, 1994, 22. 
15 
mentioned acts. However, in reality this was not the case in everyday situations. African 
Americans were still located in the bottom rung of socioeconomic standings. During this 
time of legislative enactment, they trailed non-minorities in the areas that could make a 
difference socio-economically, such as employment opportunities, educational 
attainment, increased income, and increases in life expectancy rates. John F. Kennedy 
once said, "There is little value in a Negro's obtaining the right to be admitted to hotels 
and restaurants if he has no cash in his pockets and no job. "7 The frustration of the 
African American was evidenced in the riots held in 100 major cities, such as Los 
Angeles, New York, and Chicago. The frustration spilled over in the way of fire 
bombings and labor strikes, which didn't end until an accord was reached with regard to 
the adoption of improved economic conditions and benefits for minorities. Affirmative 
action programs were adopted to diffuse the frustration and to combat the lingering 
impact of legally sanctioned racist practices. 8 
Executive Order 11,246 
Executive Order 11246, which was signed in 1965 helped to strengthen the 
enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Order required that federal contractors 
"take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed and that employees are 
7David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 22. 
8David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 22. 
16 
treated during employment without regard to their race, color, sex, or national origin. "9 
This is an effective tool for federal agencies, because if there is suspicion of 
discrimination practices operating within a company or educational facility, the agency is 
authorized to withdraw federal funding in the form of contracts. 
The Act delegated full authority to the Secretary of Labor. The responsibilities 
included administering provisions relating to nondiscrimination in employment practices 
by government contractors and subcontractors. The Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance (OFCC) was established by the Secretary of Labor during this time to ensure 
implementation of the program goals. The spirit ofvoluntarianism changed to mandatory 
enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation and policies. The government began 
enforcing affirmative action development programs. The Plans for Progress Program 
merged with the National Alliance of Business program. The goal being to provide large 
numbers of full time employment positions for disadvantaged persons. 10 
The executive order stipulates that organizations granted federal contracts of 
$10,000 or more, are prohibited from discriminating against individuals in employment 
based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Contractors are required to take 
"affirmative action" to ensure equal employment of all applicants and that employment 
9David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 22. 
10James Jones, Jr., "The Origins of Affirmative Action,'' University of Davis 
Law Review, 398. 
17 
considerations are made without regard to an applicant's race, sex, religion, color, or 
· } · · 11 nat1ona ongm. 
Companies that are recipients of federal contracts m excess of $50,000 are 
required to develop affirmative action plans which establish objectives and timetables for 
instituting increased minority and female representation to eliminate racial and/or gender 
imbalances in a manner reflective of the current local labor market. 12 
Title VII 
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, preferential gender and/or racial 
based treatment and racial and/or gender quotas are banned. Quotas are only required in 
instances where the courts have adjudged an organization guilty of perpetuating past 
discrimination practices. 13 
§703 (a)(l) of Title VII provides protection from employers who fail or refuse to 
employ, discharge, or discriminate against individuals with regard to compensation, 
terms, conditions, or employment consideration on the basis of the individual's race, 
color, sex, national origin, or religion. 14 
11Harry E. Groves and Albert Broderick, "Affirmative Action Goals Under Title 
VII: Statute, Legislative History, and Policy," Thurgood Marshall Law Review, Vol. 11, 
No. 2, Spring 1986, 29. 
12Harry E. Groves and Albert Broderick, "Affirmative Action Goals Under Title 
VII: Statute, Legislative History, and Policy," Thurgood Marshall Law Review, 29. 
13Harry E. Groves and Albert Broderick, "Affirmative Action Goals Under Title 
VII: Statute, Legislative History, and Policy," Thurgood Marshall Law Review, 29. 
14Theresa Johnson, "The Legal Use of Racial Quotas and Gender Preferences By 
Public and Private Employers," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 40, No. 7, July 1989, 420. 
18 
§703 (a)(2) of Title VII provides protection against employers who limit, 
classify, or segregate applicants or employee's in manners which would deprive or tend to 
deprive an individual of employment consideration or negatively impact the individual's 
employment status because of the individual's race, color, national origin, sex, or 
1. . 15 re 1g10n. 
Revisions were made in 1972 to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Most 
notably was the extension of Title VII's coverage applicability to state, local, and federal 
government. 16 In addition, an amendment to Title VII's remedial section was made, 
which included two additional clauses made to the statute. The revision reads: "such 
affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to ... 
reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay ... or any other equitable 
relief as the court deems appropriate." 17 It has been found that the Supreme Court has 
not categorically denied nor affirmed a response to the question concerning whether §706 
(g) grants license to affirmative action goal relief 18 
Title VII established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 
The EEOC is a quasi-legislative, administrative, judicial body that does not have the 
15Theresa Johnson, "The Legal Use of Racial Quotas and Gender Preferences By 
Public and Private Employers," Labor Law Journal, 420. 
16Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII,§ 701 (a) and (b) and 707. 
17Harry E. Groves and Albert Broderick, "Affirmative Action Goals Under Title 
VII: Statute, Legislative History, and Policy," Thurgood Marshall Law Review, 28 
18Harry E. Groves and Albert Broderick, "Affirmative Action Goals Under Title 
VII: Statute, Legislative History, and Policy," Thurgood Marshall Law Review, 28. 
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authority to enforce its legislation and/or statutes. The Commissioners are authorized to 
conduct investigations and to advocate conciliation if there is probable cause to do so. 
Enforcement is carried out by plaintiffs or an attorney general, and occasionally by the 
United States Department of Justice when patterns or practice cases are involved. Title 
VII legal enforcement is provided in the federal district court system, however they have 
limited judicial review of final agency actions. Federal courts have expansive powers to 
issue orders after establishing the presence of illegal employment practices. §706 (g) of 
Title VII provides the court with the authority to "enjoin the respondent from engaging in 
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be 
appropriate." §706 (h) prohibits the limitations imposed by the Norris-La Guardia Act on 
federal courts sitting in equity from being read into Title VIL 
The pattern or practice provision, §707 granted the Attorney General authority 
to bring action "requesting such relief, including an application for a permanent or 
temporary injunction, restraining order or other order against the person or persons 
responsible for such pattern or practice, as he/she deems necessary to ensure the full 
enjoyment of the rights herein described." 19 
§708(g) of Title VII grants the court authority to enjoin the respondent from 
engaging in any unlawful practices and orders appropriate affirmative action remedies, 
but isn't restricted to reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without restitution, or 
19Harry E. Groves and Albert Broderick, "Affirmative Action Goals Under Title 
VII: Statute, Legislative History, and Policy," Thurgood Marshall Law Review, 29. 
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any other appropriate equitable relief if found that the employer engaged or intentionally 
engaged in unlawful employment practices. 20 
Federal and state agencies have separate affirmative action objectives and 
requirements. The EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) is a federal 
agency that was established to monitor and enforce compliance with the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. The authority of the EEOC was enhanced in the 1972 Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act. This act broadened the powers of the commission to include 
monitoring of all companies with more than 15 employees. Initially, the threat of being 
charged with an EEOC infraction prompted a great number of companies to enact 
voluntary affirmative action programs. However, a EEOC suit can drag on within the 
federal court system for a number of years. They are also very difficult to prove, with the 
burden of proof being placed on the plaintiff. During the Reagan and Bush 
administrations 1980-1992, it was an unwritten rule that prosecution of civil rights 
discrimination suits were not significant, and received low priority ranking among more 
significant cases. This effectively opened the gates to corporate racial/ethnic and gender 
discrimination, without threat of recrimination. 21 
20Harry E. Groves and Albert Broderick, "Affirmative Action Goals Under Title 
VII: Statute, Legislative History, and Policy," Thurgood Marshall Law Review, 29. 
21 David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 22 
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The Philadelphia Plan 
During 1967-68, the Department of Labor developed the Philadelphia Plan in 
response to the OFCC's concern and growing frustration in its attempts to devise a 
method of promoting minority representation within the construction industry. 
However, it was found that the plan violated competitive bidding principles by requesting 
that the affirmative action requirements be determined after the contractors had let their 
bids. The Philadelphia Plan was revised and reissued during the Nixon administration. 
The goal of the plan was to stimulate the construction industry. However, the most 
famous aspect of the plan was that it provided the fundamental basis for establishing 
standards for affirmative action programs which are applicable to non construction 
employers. The Philadelphia Plan addressed three specific needs. First, there was a 
problem of labor unions excluding minorities from entrance into local unionization. 
Second, there was the problem of the refusal of labor unions to replace lost workers due 
to the creation of new jobs and attrition with workers trained under the auspices of the 
union apprenticeship programs. Third, the problem encountered when Philadelphia 
contractors refused to employ qualified minorities for available construction positions. 22 
Proponents of the Philadelphia Plan could not ignore the fact that even if the 
plan's goals were fully achieved, the representation of minorities on a construction 
project would have been lower than the total percentage of African American 
construction workers available in the labor market. The only requirement that the federal 
22James Jones, Jr., "The Origins of Affirmative Action", University of Davis 
Law Review, 399. 
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government stipulated was that the construction organization make a "good faith effort to 
achieve the goals." The plan prohibited employers from engaging in overt discriminatory 
practices. However, the plan did not establish a quota system to ensure parity in 
employment. The plan did not require employers to employ unqualified minorities or to 
discriminate against non-minorities in order to satisfy the requirements of the plan. The 
penalty for an employer who failed to meet the prescribed goals and timetables warranted 
an investigation into the manner in which the employer established the plan to achieve its 
goals. In order to establish presumptive compliance under the terms of the Philadelphia 
Plan, an employer is required to meet the goals and timetables established under the 
executive order. Provided that the employer did not have any formal accusations of 
discrimination lodged against the company, the government deems that the employer has 
satisfied all components in its obligation as a federal contractor.23 
The Philadelphia Plan has been challenged in federal courts on the grounds of 
Title VII violation, violating the National Labor Relations Act, exceeding the scope of 
the Secretary of Labor's authority under the Philadelphia Plan, exceeding Presidential 
authority under the U.S. Constitution, and as a violation of the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments under the constitution. However, the Third Circuit court rejected all of the 
arguments presented against the Philadelphia Plan and established judicial authority 
legalizing the President's Executive Order Program. The decision of the court validated 
23Harry E. Groves and Albert Broderick, "Affirmative Action Goals Under Title 
VII: Statute, Legislative History, and Policy,'' Thurgood Marshall Law Review, 29. 
23 
the use of goals and timetables in establishing affirmative action programs to eliminate 
past vestiges of racism. 24 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 
In 1989, the court decided in Patterson v McLean Credit Union to significantly 
narrow the scope of the application of the 1866 Act. 25 The decision contributed to the 
widely held belief among civil rights lobbyist that the court was reversing the advances of 
civil rights legislation. The decision of this case contributed to the urgency of the 
insistence of the Civil Right' s lobbyist to enact new legislation strengthening anti 
discrimination legislation in the form of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Act was 
designed to ensure a broader interpretation of the 1866 Act and to be more inclusive than 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.26 
Specifically, the Act protects non-minorities in reverse discrimination actions. 
It mandates that all potentially affected parties are required to be afforded the opportunity 
of participation in the consent decree process. Title VII legislation prohibits employers 
from classifying employees in a manner which "would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee because of such individual's race. "27 However, employers are not prohibited 
24Harry E. Groves and Albert Broderick, "Affirmative Action Goals Under Title 
VII: Statute, Legislative History, and Policy," Thurgood Marshall Law Review, 29. 
25Patterson v McLean Credit Union, 87 U.S. 107. 
26Bron Raymond Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and 
Ethics'', 17. 
2742 U.S.C. §2000e-2. 
24 
from designing affirmative action plans that advance the purpose of Title VII intentions 
of breaking down racial barriers that promote segregation or eliminate employment 
discrimination. 28 
Race-conscious affirmative action plans, especially those initiated by the federal 
government are required to be subjected to a higher degree of scrutiny by the court 
system. This is done in order to ensure that "those employees not benefiting from the 
plan" do not have their individual interests infringed upon unduly by their employers. 29 
Civil Rights Issues Challenging Public Sector Employment 
Interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been cumbersome and tenuous 
at best. The Supreme Court has had the arduous task of making the final decision as to 
the application of the law to various cases. Some of the questions that they are faced 
with concern the question of whether an employer is being discriminatory if it requires its 
prospective employees to take an examination, given the fact that African Americans fail 
the test in disproportionately greater numbers than non-minorities? Another question that 
they are faced with, concerns whether a firing policy based on seniority is acceptable if, 
due to past vestiges of racial and gender discrimination practices, the majority of the 
older employees are white? There is also the ethical question as to whether a racially 
imbalanced work force is prima facie30 evidence of blatant discrimination?31 
28Robert K. Robinson, John Seydel, and Hugh J. Sloan, "Reverse Discrimination 
Employment Litigation: Defining the Limits of Preferential Promotion," Labor Law 
Journal, Vol. 46, No. 3, March 1995, 136. 
29Johnson at 632. 
25 
Thirty years after the implementation of the first programs, affirmative action 
programs are being implemented in almost every segment of American society. This 
issue has become one of the most divisive and polarizing issues in American politics. The 
very notion of affirmative action and minority set aside programs have become a 
prominent part of the America work ethic. Affirmative action programs and other equal 
opportunity programs have been responsible for the integration of minorities and women 
with respect to educational and socio-economic strides that have helped to place these 
traditionally disadvantaged groups into the American mainstream. 32 
There was an innate problem associated with affirmative action. It was never 
clearly defined and was ambiguous in terms. It was initially intended to pacify African 
Americans, but was enlarged in scope to include all minorities, women, and the 
disadvantaged. Affirmative action protection encompasses almost every facet 
imaginable with regard to ensuring equal opportunity access. It includes employment, 
higher education, and set aside programs. Critics have deemed that affirmative action is 
"reverse discrimination" and just as prolific as discrimination because minorities receive 
favorable consideration on the basis of their race, irrespective of merit. However their 
adversaries contend that affirmative action programs serve to balance economic and 
30Literally means "matter of fact." Oran's Dictionary of Law. 
31David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 23. 
32David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 22. 
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educational distribution opportunities by providing incentive and training programs to 
traditionally disadvantaged members of American society. 33 
Polls consistently confirm the fact that non-minorities are anti-affirmative action 
proponents. More than 70% of whites believe that non-minorities are being deprived of 
employment opportunities because of racial quotas and set aside programs. The general 
consensus among non-minorities is the belief that a potential employer would employ a 
minority to fill a position based upon a racial quota mandated by either a affirmative 
action or voluntary affirmative action program. Conversely, an overwhelming majority of 
non-minorities support open housing programs in which minorities are given the 
opportunity to live in areas that they select to live. They also support the concept of 
integrated schools and facilities. However if the question posed mentions affirmative 
action programs and possible negative effects on non-minorities, then the support for 
education and employment opportunities becomes negative. This general attitude has far 
reaching implications on political agendas and platforms. Affirmative action has failed to 
attract popular support within the American mainstream. There is also a growing number 
of African American intelligentsia who question the wisdom of race targeted policies that 
are the bread and butter substinence of affirmative action programs. There is a growing 
sentiment that affirmative action programs have not aided minorities. Instead, it is felt 
that they have contributed to the break down within the African American families value 
system and strong work ethic. 
33David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 22. 
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One of the most outspoken advocates of decreased affirmative action programs 
is William Julius Wilson, of the University of Chicago. He advocates the imposition of 
race neutral measures to improve the plight of the poor. 34 This is viewed to be 
contradictory among non-minorities because affirmative action programs 
disproportionately benefit African Americans and are viewed as being politically correct 
to the majority population. Glenn Loury of Boston University is another African 
American anti-affirmative action advocate. He supports the contention that affirmative 
action programs significantly diminish African Americans from gaining the incentive to 
acquire educational and vocational skills, which would enable them to become more 
productive members of society. 35 Stephen Carter of Yale advocates the Pure Equality of 
Opportunity Principle. This is the perception among whites that a African American 
employee is the best possible candidate, rather than merely because of his race.36 Another 
minority anti-affirmative action advocate, Shelby Steele believes that the race neutral 
policies narrows African American objectives. He believes that racial preferences emit 
the negative message that African Americans are more proud of their past suffering than 
in their present achievements. 37 
34David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 22. 
35David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 22. 
36David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 22. 
37David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 22. 
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Studies have shown that African Americans are three times more likely than 
whites to live below the poverty level. The unemployment rate for African Americans is 
twice that of the rate for whites. On average, African American men earn approximately 
73% of a white males salary. African Americans also are placed at a disadvantage 
educationally. Even though graduation rates have increased since the 1970's, African 
American college enrollment has declined. African American faculty representation is 
approximately 3% of total academic staff in American colleges and universities. Overall, 
African Americans represent 12% of the total American population. 38 
The African American middle class population has profited from affirmative 
action programs. It has been found that 30% of the African American population consist 
of middle class African Americans. It has been reasoned that the increase in African 
American middle class representation can be attributed to significant inroads in 
education as a result of affirmative action policies and programs. This is in stark contrast 
to the fact that there has been virtually no measurable upward mobility among African 
Americans since 1975. This fact has fueled the debate that the only beneficiaries of the 
affirmative action programs have been African American middle class participants, not 
the disadvantaged African Americans, which were the original target group. On the other 
side, it is also argued that all African Americans suffer some aspect of racial 
discrimination, not just the economically or educationally disadvantaged. 39 
38David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 22. 
39David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 22. 
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The ongoing battle between the winners and losers in the affirmative action war 
is far from over. There have been tradeoffs due to the gains of affirmative action 
policies. There have been increases in minority and/or female representation in white 
and blue collar positions. The tradeoff has occurred among those minorities or females 
who have steady employment and those who are habitually unemployed. This is both 
true for African Americans who have college degrees and those without. 40 
Since the middle 1960's, there has been a significant increase in the number of 
African Americans employed in the public sector or in organizations with ties to the 
public sector. Conversely, there has been a significant decrease in minority 
representation among private sector employment. The reason for this shift is obvious. 
Federal contractors are experiencing strong pressure to increase the amount of their 
organization's minority and female representation in order to receive federal contracts 
and meet federal compliance guidelines. Private sector organizations are discouraged 
from recruiting minorities and females because of the growing belief that they are not 
cost effective. It is believed that minorities and females require extensive training and 
special treatment. The extensive training is due to under education. The special 
treatment is due to the possible threat of litigation due to Title VII or constitutional 
violations lodged by individual treated unfairly. 41 The consequence of the public sector 
4°navid Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 22 
41David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 22 
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embracement of minorities and females, is that government policy tends to have twice 
the impact on African Americans than it has on white employees. 42 
Preferential Treatment Issues Affecting Public Sector Employment 
The answer to the question with regard to when an employer has the right to 
practice affirmative action in awarding preferential treatment in hiring and promotions 
has never been fully answered by the federal court system. It is an accepted rule of 
thumb to assume that an employer is required to practice affirmative action measures 
whenever the organization is a government contractor/subcontractor or whenever the 
court has ordered the organization to implement an affirmative action plan due to 
evidence of past discrimination practices currently impacting minorities. 43 
Provided that the organization seeks a governmental contract, it must satisfy the 
provisions set forth under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, and the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. The federal government requires contractors and 
subcontractors receiving government contracts to be affirmative action contractors. In 
effect, this requires contractors/subcontractors receiving contracts worth $10,000 or more 
to establish proof that they are affirmative action contractors. If the contract is estimated 
to be worth $50,000 or more, the contractor/subcontractor must submit a copy of their 
written affirmative action plan to the federal government. In order for the 
42David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 22 
43John A. Gray, "Preferential Affirmative Action in Employment," Labor Law 
Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1, January 1992, 25-26 
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contractor/subcontractor to receive the award of a contract worth in excess of $1 million, 
the affirmative action plan must be approved by the Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance Programs (OFCCP). The OFCCP requires that in addition to the contracting 
unit, the entire business organization is required to practice affirmative action policy. 
The OFCCP also requires that the contractor/subcontractor must not have any 
implemented quota system or set aside programs. However, the contractor/subcontractor 
must have established timetables and goals for the total implementation of the 
affirmative action plan. 
The OFCCP is a public enforcement agency, which is also a division of the 
Department of Labor. Executive Order 11,246 (race and gender); Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (physical and mental disabilities); and the Vietnam Era 
Veterans Readjustment Act of 197 4 (Vietnam veterans) are the legal basis for requiring 
government contractors/subcontractors to have representational parity in their 
employment force. 44 
In 1989, the OFCCP reported that there were approximately 24 million 
employees working under the federal auspices of private contractors/subcontractors. 
However, the total work force at that time was 120 million. These figures are 
approximated because it does not reflect the number of employees of 
contractors/subcontractors employed at the state and local levels. It does not include the 
total number of employees employed by organizations stipulated by federal court order or 
44John A. Gray, "Preferential Affirmative Action in Employment," Labor Law 
Journal, 26. 
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consent decrees to increase minority and/or gender representation within their 
compames. Only federal courts are authorized to impose rigid quotas and timetables on 
. . 45 orgamzations. 
All public and private sector employers covered by Title VII are required to be 
in full compliance with Title VII limitations. This includes organizations who have self 
imposed voluntary affirmative action programs, as well as those employers required to do 
so under mandatory affirmative action programs imposed by the federal courts. 
In Weber v. USW & Kaiser Aluminum,46 the case centers around the fact that 
the defendant, USW & Kaiser Aluminum adopted a voluntary affirmative action program 
as a condition of a collective bargaining agreement made between the union and 
management. The voluntary affirmative action plan established the goal of providing 
training opportunities to African Americans, regardless of the fact that they had less 
seniority than non-minorities. The plan also called for the organization to reserve 50 
positions for African American employment. 47 
The Supreme Court held that the voluntary plan did not violate Title VII's 
prohibition against "discrimination on the basis of race." This was a landmark decision 
because USW & Kaiser Aluminum had no record of having any past discriminatory 
practices with regard to hiring and promoting African Americans. Even though the Court 
45John A. Gray, "Preferential Affirmative Action in Employment,'' Labor Law 
Journal, 26. 
46 Weber v. USW & Kaiser Aluminum, 443 U.S. S.Ct. 193 (1979). 
47John A. Gray, "Preferential Affirmative Action in Employment," Labor Law 
Journal, 27. 
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did not mandate the voluntary affirmative action plan, the Court found that the employer 
"may lawfully discrimination on the basis of race without violating Title VII, so long as 
the employer's plan is within certain limits." The Court required that voluntary plans 
must have a remedial purpose, that it doesn't impact non-minority employment 
opportunities, and doesn't unnecessarily trammel the rights of non-minorities. This 
decision as well as the Johnson decision extended the protections and requirements to 
promotions and gender discrimination issues. There are four conditions that make or 
preclude a legally valid affirmative action plan: 
( 1) The plan must have a remedial purpose, designed to eradicate a 
statistically significant imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories. 
(2) The plan must be temporary in duration, implemented in a manner that 
is done to attain, but not maintain parity within the work force. 
(3) The plan must not impede on non-minority and male employment 
opportunities. 
( 4) The plan does not unnecessarily trammel the rights of others or 
necessitate the replacement of employees currently in place. 48 
Public sector employers must follow the guidelines set forth under Title VII, as 
well as the guidelines of the Equal Protection Clause, as defined under Wygant and 
Johnson as discussed later. 
The Supreme Court held that government classification based on race are 
subject to the strictest scrutiny and must satisfy both of the requirements as set forth 
under the Strict Scrutiny Two Prong Standard. The standard requires that "the 
48John A Gray, "Preferential Affirmative Action in Employment," Labor Law 
Journal, 26. 
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government must establish . . . that there is an imbalance by companng the racial 
composition of its work force with that of the reasonably available qualified labor pool; 
that the government's own past discriminatory practices created the imbalance; and that 
the plan is necessary to remedy the imbalance. "49 These requirements were established 
under the terms of the Wygant decision. This decision has come to be associated with 
the requirement that state and local governments are allowed to establish voluntary 
affirmative action plan within their jurisdiction, provided that the plan is designed 
specifically to remedy the present effects of the government's participation m 
contributing to the perpetuation of past discriminatory employment practices. 
Under Croson legislation, state and local governments are prohibited from 
imposing minority set aside requirements on their contractors/subcontractors, except in 
instances in which the government is attempting to remedy "the present effects of either 
government's own identifiable past discriminatory practices" of contacting firms in the 
local industry. 
Constitutional limits established under Wygant and Croson 
( 1) State and local governments affirmative action plans that utilize racial 
classifications for employment purposes are subject to strict scrutiny. 
(2) State and local governments may not itself be a voluntary affirmative 
action employer, except in instances to remedy its own identifiable past 
discriminatory practices. 
(3) Affirmative action lay-offs are not allowed. 
49John A. Gray, "Preferential Affirmative Action in Employment," Labor Law 
Journal, 28. 
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( 4) State and local government MBE set asides are not allowed, except to 
remedy either government's own past discriminatory practices or those of the local 
industry, and then no more than necessary to remedy the identified 
discrimination. 50 
Interestingly enough, no court case has addressed the constitutionality of 
governmental requirements that stipulate that contractors be affirmative action 
employers. The Equal Protection Clause of the constitution allows local and state 
governments to require affirmative action employment practices of their own contractors 
only to serve a compelling governmental interest of remedying past vestiges of racial and 
gender discrimination. 
Reverse discrimination suits question the methods used to create gender/racial 
parity among organizations with or without established affirmative action plans. They 
can be initiated either when an employer has an affirmative action plan in place, or 
whenever the employer does not have an established affirmative action plan. Provided 
that there is an established affirmative action plan, the employer is admitting in effect 
that racial or other criterion are acting as a determinant in making employment decisions. 
The employer defends his/her method of making employment decisions by alleging that 
the employment consideration was made pursuant to the voluntary affirmative action 
plan. The plaintiff has the arduous task of providing the burden of proof to establish the 
invalidity of the affirmative action plan. The plaintiff has the option of using one or more 
of the four Title VII limitations to support his/her contention. Provided that a public 
sector employer or independent contractor is party to the case, a defense is required to be 
50John A Gray, "Preferential Affirmative Action in Employment," Labor Law 
Journal, 28. 
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made under the constitutional limits established under either the Wygant or Croson 
51 cases. 
If the employer does not have a formally established affirmative action plan, the 
Court has the option of requiring a modification to the McDonnell Douglass and Burdine 
prima facie requirement. For example, the Court may require the plaintiff to introduce 
evidence that supports the contention that race was a determining factor beyond the fact 
that a minority was employed for a position that a non-minority applied. 52 
The next chapter is the third chapter, which provides an analysis of the major 
themes common in supreme court affirmative action legislation. 
51John A. Gray, "Preferential Affirmative Action in Employment," Labor Law 
Journal, 29. 
52John A. Gray, "Preferential Affirmativ~ Action in Employment," Labor Law 
Journal, 29. 
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Table 1 --- Differences between EEOC and Mandatory Affirmative Action 
EEOC Mandatory 
Employee Coverage All employees with an Contractors and 
established number of subcontractors 
employees 
Factor Included Includes more prohibited Includes preferential 
factors, such as age and treatment for minorities, 
religion. women, handicapped, and 
veterans. 
Legal Basis Title VII, Americans with Executive Order 11,246, 
Disabilities Act (ADEA), Vocational Rehabilitation 
etc. Act, and Vietnam Veterans 
Act. 
Basis Legal Obligation Prohibits discrimination on Requires an employer to use 
the basis of any one of the "its best good faith efforts" 
stated factors, and allows to achieve representational 
discrimination subject to parity. 
certain conditions on the 
basis of race and gender. 
Enforcement Mechanism The EEOC and OFCCP There is no private cause of 
issues a "right to sue" letter action, except to challenge 
under EEOC laws. the constitutionality of the 
action. 
Source: Preferential Affimiali vc Action in Employment. 11 
53David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman & 
Society, 30. 
CHAPTER 3 
ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR THEMES OF SUPREME COURT AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION LEGISLATION 
This study has analyzed the decision of sixteen federal court cases. The 
conclusion found that the decision of the cases were primarily based upon the decision 
reached in City of Richmond v J.A. Croson1 in 1989 with regard to equal protection 
clause challenges, and Johnson v Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County2 in 1987 
with regard to Title VII challenges. This study includes eight affirmative action cases 
alleging violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth amendment; six 
affirmative action cases alleging violation of Title VII; and two cases that allege that an 
affirmative action plan was in violation of both the equal protection clause and Title VII. 
Equal Protection Clause 
The Fourteenth amendment Equal Protection Clause stipulates that States are 
prohibited from enforcing or creating legislation which denies an individual's rights as 
afforded by the U.S. Constitution. Analysis of a claim of an equal protection violation is 
1City of Richmond v J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469. 
2Johnson v Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County,107 S.Ct 1442 (1987). 
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compared with the conditions set forth in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 3 These are 
known as the "Two Prong Strict Scrutiny" analysis. Under this standard, the preference 
given to minorities in affirmative action court decisions must be justified by a compe1ling 
governmental interest that is achieved only through narrowly tailored means. Court 
sanctioned preferential employment consideration must serve a compelling governmental 
interest of remedying past vestiges of racial and/or gender discrimination. The following 
eight cases concern the issue of Equal Protection Clause, Fourteenth amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution violations. 
Richmond v J.A. Croson 
The most significant aspect of this case is the Supreme Court determination that 
the strict scrutiny standard is applicable to any affirmative action plan that is based upon 
racial classifications. The strict scrutiny two prong test requires that racial classifications 
are only necessary in instances that are justified by a compelling governmental interest, 
and that the means used to achieve these goals are narrowly tailored to affect the 
compelling governmental interest. 4 
The Croson case centers around one principle of law: the constitutionality of the 
City's minority set aside program. Specifically, the challenge addresses the issue of 
3City of Richmond v J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469. 
4Leslie A Nay and James E. Jones, Jr., "Equal Employment and Affirmative 
Action in Local Governments: A Profile," Law and Inequality, A Journal of Theory and 
Practice, The University of Minnesota Law School, Vol. VII, No. 1, November 1989, 
122. 
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whether the set aside pro!:,Tfam was in violation of the Fourteenth amendment's equal 
protection clause. The City of Richmond required that prime contractors awarded City 
construction contracts, subcontract at least 30% of the value of each contract to one or 
more Minority Business Enterprises. The plan was designed to be remedial in nature, 
however it was adopted after a public hearing concluded that there was no direct 
evidence of either past racial discriminatory practices regarding the letting of business 
contracts or evidence that prime contractors had discriminated against minority 
subcontractors. The adoption was based upon the allegation that there was wide spread 
racism occurring within the construction industry, and that less than 1 % of total City 
contracts had been awarded to minority contractors within the last four years. 5 
In order to determine the constitutionality of the affirmative action plan, the 
Court analyzed the necessity of the set aside remedial measure. It was found that even 
though the general African American population of the City was 50%, only .67% of the 
prime contracts had been awarded to minority contractors within recent years. The City 
provided waivers to individual contractors who provided proof that sufficient minority 
contractors/subcontractors were either unwilling to participate in the plan or unavailable. 
The Court applied the Strict Scrutiny Two Prong test to determine the constitutionality of 
the program. The test is not dependent upon the racial composition of the people 
burdened by the racial classification. It assumes that the State is pursuing a remedial 
goal that is worthy of warranting the implementation of an affirmative action plan, and 
that the means designed to remedy past discrimination practices is compelling enough to 
5Croson at 477. 
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substantiate the fact that there is not possibility that the employer's motives for the racial 
classification was stereotypical or based upon racial prejudice. 6 
ft was found that the City's plan violated both prongs of the test. The plan was 
not justified by a compelling governmental interest, because the record did not reveal any 
past evidence of racial discriminatory practices imposed upon minority contractors or 
subcontractors during the letting of contracts. The Court found that the City failed to 
demonstrate a compelling governmental interest that justified the enactment of the plan. 
The factual predicate supporting the plan did not establish the type of identifiable past 
discrimination in the City's construction industry that would warrant the race conscious 
relief under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.7 
It failed the second prong of the test because the 30% set aside program was not 
narrowly tailored to accomplish a remedial purpose of remedying past discriminatory 
practices, which occurred solely on the basis of the contractors or subcontractor racial 
classification. The plan entitled African American, Oriental, or Hispanic entrepreneurs 
from virtually anywhere in the United States to be awarded absolute preference over 
nonminorities, based solely on the contractors or subcontractors race. 8 It was detennined 
that the plan's waiver didn't inquire whether the particular Minority Business Enterprise 
6Croson at 4 72. 
7 Croson at 4 70. 
8Croson at 470. 
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in question seeking racial preference classification had suffered from the effects of past 
discrimination practices employed by the City or prime contractors. 9 
Wygant v Board of Education 
The Wygant case centers around two principles of law, the Strict Scrutiny Two 
Prong test and statistical disparity evidence. Specifically, the challenge addresses the 
issue of whether the Board of Education's layoff plan is in direct violation of the 
Fourteenth amendment, equal protection clause rights of the displaced non-minority 
teachers. 
The collective bargaining agreement between the Board of Education and the 
teacher's union provided that if it became necessary to lay off teachers, those with the 
most seniority would be retained. However, the provision also stipulated that at no time 
would there be a greater percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the lay 
off than minorities. n essence, this meant that during certain school years, non-minority 
teachers were laid off, while minority teachers with less seniority were retained. 
The Court addressed the issue regarding voluntary adoption of affirmative 
action plans by public employers. The City and its union negotiated a collective 
bargaining agreement that established affirmative action provisions in hiring, however it 
also protected minority teachers from the effects of downsizing. The Court majority held 
that the provision regarding the layoffs was unconstitutional, in that it failed both prongs 
of the strict scrutiny standard test. The designated plan failed because it was not 
9Croson at 471. 
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narrowly tailored to address the remedial need and effects of past discrimination. It also 
failed because the Board of Education sought to maintain minority hiring levels that were 
irrelevant to remedying past employment discrimination practices. 10 
It was found that the layoff provision operated to the disadvantage of non-
minorities, because it constituted a classification based upon race. The Court reasoned 
that in affirmative action cases, a employer's use of racial classification must be 
scrutinized for conflicts with constitutional rights. 11 It must meet the terms of the strict 
scrutiny two prong test. It must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and 
be narrowly tailored to meet the goals of remedying past employment discrimination 
practices. 12 However, the presence of societal discrimination alone is not sufficient 
evidence to justify a employer's use of racial classification. Convincing evidence of 
prior discrimination by the governmental entity involved is required before an employer 
is allowed limited use of racial classification for remedial purposes. The District Court 
found that the remedial measure was permissible under the equal protection clause as a 
remedy for past employment discrimination. It was believe that the presence of minority 
teaching faculty would aid in eradicating societal discrimination, by providing positive 
role models for minority students. However, the Supreme Court found that the "role 
model" theory suggested by the District Court would encourage the Board of Education 
to employ discriminatory hiring and lay off practices for periods longer than necessary to 
10James Jones, Jr., "The Origins of Affirmative Action,'' University of Davis 
Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 2, Winter 1988, 407. 
11 Wygant v Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986) at 273. 
12Wygant at 274. 
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achieve a legitimate remedial purpose. The use of role models wasn't relative to the 
injustices cause by prior discriminatory employment practices. The acknowledgment that 
there had been pervasive societal discrimination was not sufficient evidence to justify the 
use of race conscious remedial action or imposition of a racially classified remedy. 13 
Provided that the layoff provisions purpose was to remedy prior discrimination 
practices, the constitutional validity required the District Court to make a factual 
determination that the Board of Education had a strong basis in evidence to support the 
contention that the implementation of the layoff provision was necessary. 14 
The Court requires proof of prior discriminatory history prior to allowing the 
restricted use of racial classification and other affirmative action remedial measures to be 
imposed as a remedy. There must be a relevant analysis of current and past case history 
used to prove discrimination by statistical disparity. The analysis must focus on 
disparities that demonstrate or evidence prior governmental discrirnination. 15 In this case, 
it was reasoned that had the plaintiff provided statistical evidence as to the percentage of 
qualified minority teachers available in the relevant labor market to demonstrate that the 
Board's hiring practice of African American teachers over a period of time had equaled 
the percentage employed by the Board, the case would have probably been decided 
differently. 16 It was the opinion of the Court that the Board should have had convincing 
13Wygant at 267. 
14Wygant at 267-68. 
15Wygant at 267-68. 
16Wygant at 275. 
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evidence to support the contention that an affirmative action program was warranted 
prior to implementing the program. 17 The layoff provision was not a governmental 
interest and was not narrowly framed to accomplish the goal of eradicating past 
discriminatory hiring and promotional practices within the department. 
The Supreme Court found that other less intrusive alternatives were available to 
accomplish the goal of remedying prior employment discriminatory practices, such as the 
adoption of hiring objectives. Therefore, the layoff provision was not sufficiently 
narrowly tailored as a means of accomplishing a legitimate purpose. 18 
The Wygant decision reflects the Justice Department's assertion that affirmative 
action is restricted to granting remedial measures to a defined group of discrimination 
victims. 19 It was the opinion of the Court that the Board should have had convincing 
evidence that an affirmative action program was warranted, prior to implementing 
Federal Court program. 20 The layoff provision was a governmental interest and was not 
narrowly framed to accomplish the goal of eradicating past discriminatory hiring and 
promotional practices within the department. 
17Wygant at 267 
18Wygant at 268 
19James Jones, Jr., "The Origins of Affirmative Action", University of Davis 
Law Review, 409. 
20Wygant at 277. 
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United States v Paradise 
In 1972, it was found that the Alabama Department of Public Safety, herein 
after referred to as the "Department" had systematically excluded African Americans 
from employment as state troopers for over four decades. The National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) brought action against the Department 
challenging the Department's long-standing practice of excluding African Americans 
from employment. The United States was joined as a party plaintiff, and Philip Paradise, 
Jr., intervened on behalf of a class of African American plaintiffs. The District Court 
issued an order imposing a hiring quota and requiring the Department to refrain from 
engaging in discrimination in its employment practices, including promotions. The 
Department was required to hire one African American trooper for each white trooper 
elevated in rank, until African Americans constituted approximately 25% of the state 
trooper force. The Court also required that the African Americans who were promoted 
were qualified to be promoted in rank. The Court required that the Department provide a 
copy of the test used in promotions and to furnish the Court a listing of the eligible 
candidates. This was known as the 1972 Order. The defendants appealed the decision, 
but the Fifth Circuit upheld the hiring requirement. 21 
The Court of Appeals held that the Department did not violate the rights of due 
process or equal protection of the white applicants who had higher eligibility rankings 
21 United States v Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) at 149-50. 
47 
than the African Americans when the quota was implemented. The Department imposed 
the 1979 and 1981 decrees. 
In 1981, the Department administered a test for the purpose of promoting 
candidates to the rank of corporal. The test was administered to 262 applicants, of whom 
60 (23%) were African American. Only 5 (8.3%) of the African Americans scored in the 
top half of the promotion register, the highest ranking African American was numbered 
80 on the promotion eligibility list The United States inquired about the standing of the 
consent order. The Department indicate that there was an immediate need to make 8-10 
corporal promotions and indicated that it would elevate 16-20 individuals before 
construction of a new promotion eligibility listing. 22 
Eleven years later, a motion to enforce the 1979 and 1981 decree was filed by 
the United States. The United States found that the Department's failure to produce a 
promotion plan in compliance with the decrees suggested the possibility that the 
Department was engaging in continued discrimination practices. 23 The District Court 
found that the Department failed to develop promotion procedures which didn't have an 
adverse affect on African Americans. The District Court ordered the Department to 
promote one African American trooper for each white trooper elevated in rank, provided 
that the African Americans promoted were qualified for the position. The deadline 
suggested that the Department was obligated to continue the program until the 
Department implemented an acceptable promotion procedure. 
22Paradise at 160. 
23Paradise at 161. 
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After the U.S. filed the motion to enforce, four white applicants who sought 
promotion to corporal rank sought to intervene on behalf of a class composed of those 
white applicants who took the proposed corporal's examination and ranked between the 
numbers 1-79. The issue at question was whether the 1979 and 1981 decrees and the 
sought after relief proposed by the plaintiffs had an adverse affect on their constitutional 
rights. 
The District Court entered an order in 1983 holding that the Department's 
selection procedure had an adverse affect on African American candidates for promotion. 
Consequently, the District Court set a deadline for submission of a promotion plan 
consisting of at least 15 qualified African American candidates to the rank of corporal in 
a manner that would not have an adverse racial impact on minorities. 24 
The District Court granted the plaintiffs motion to enforce the 1979 and 1981 
decrees and designed another relief mechanism. The Court held that for a specific 
period, 50% of the corporal promotions would be given to qualified African Americans. 
The remedial relief was also designed to address the Department's delay in developing 
acceptable promotion procedures for all ranks. 25 The Court imposed a 50% promotion 
quota in the upper ranks, but maintained that promotions would occur only in cases 
where there were qualified African American candidates; if the rank was less than 25% 
African American, and provided that the Department had not developed and 
implemented an affirmative action promotion plan without adverse impact on 
24Paradise at 162. 
25Paradise at 163. 
49 
nonminorities for the relevant rank.26 The Department was ordered to submit a schedule 
to the Court for the development of promotion procedures for all ranks above that of the 
entry level. 
In 1984, the Department promoted eight African Americans and eight whites to 
the position of corporal, pursuant to the District Court's order enforcing the consent 
decrees. The Department also submitted to the District Court found that the Department 
could promote up to 13 troopers utilizing the promotion procedure and suspended 
application of the one-for-one requirement for the promotion purpose. Later in the year, 
after approval of the promotion procedure for sergeant, the Court suspended application 
of the quota at the sergeant's rank. 
The U.S. Supreme Court found that the race conscious relief ordered in this case 
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth amendment, however it was found 
that the court system could constitutionally employ racial classifications essential to 
remedying unlawful discrimination based upon race or ethnicity. Remedying past or 
present racial discrimination is a justifiable state interest to warrant the remedial use of a 
carefully constructed affirmative action program. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District 
Court's order. The Court of Appeals held that the relief at issue was designed to remedy 
the present effects of past discrimination. In addition, the relief awarded was found to be 
necessary to accomplish the objectives of remedying historical racial imbalances in the 
26Paradise at 163. 
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upper ranks of the Department. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision 
of the District Court. 27 
The case centers around the legal principles of the strict scrutiny two prong test 
and the appropriate use of race conscious remedies in affirmative action programs. The 
race conscious relief that was issued as a remedy, was considered to be justified by a 
compelling interest in remedying past discrimination practices that permeated entry level 
hiring and promotional practices. The Croson case decision was applied to this case. 
The enforcement order is supported by the strict scrutiny test, because it was narrowly 
tailored to meet the needs of a compelling governmental interest in eradicating past 
discriminatory practices and by the societal interest in complying with judgments of the 
federal courts. It has been decided that in determining whether race conscious remedies 
are appropriate, there are several factors that must be considered. Firs, there must be a 
decision as to the necessity of the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies. Second, 
there must be a stated term concerning the flexibility and duration of the relief, including 
the availability of waiver provisions. Third, there must be a decision as to the 
relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market. Fourth, the impact of the 
relief on the rights of third parties must be decided. 28 
27Paradise at 165-66. 
28Leslie A. Nay and James E. Jones, Jr., "Equal Employment and Affirmative 
Action in Local Governments: A Profile, " Law and Inequality, A Journal of Theory and 
Practice, The University of Minnesota Law School, 124-25. 
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After careful analysis of all of these provisions, the court found that the one to 
one promotion requirement was narrowly tailored to serve its purposes, both as applied to 
the initial set of promotions to the corporal rank and as a continuing contingent order 
with respect to the upper ranks. 29 
In this instance, it was found that over a period of four decades, the Department 
deliberately sought to systematically exclude African Americans from all positions 
including the upper ranks of the Department. This was found to be a flagrant violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. It was determined that the exclusion of African Americans 
from entry level positions precluded African Americans from eventually seeking 
promotions to upper ranking levels. This also resulted in a departmental hierarchy 
exclusively dominated by non-minorities. During the course of court proceedings, it was 
found that within 37 years, there had never been an African American trooper employed 
by the Department at any level. 
The District Court found that the Department deliberately stalled the imposition 
of the Decree objectives and deliberately aided the discrimination practices that were 
already being perpetuated. It is also a fact that by 1983, the Department had only 
promoted four African American troopers, and that these promotions were made pursuant 
to the 1979 Decree, not by the voluntary affirmative action plan that was adopted by the 
Department. The Department continued to operate employment practices that excluded 
African Americans from promotion opportunities. 30 
29Paradise at 171. 
30Paradise at 169. 
52 
The purpose of the order was intended to eliminate the effects of the 
Department's "long term, open, and pervasive" discrimination, including the exclusion of 
African Americans from all upper levels of rank. The order was also designed to ensure 
expeditious compliance with the 1979 and 1981 decrees by inducing the Department to 
implement a promotion procedure schedule that would not have an adverse affect on 
African Americans. The court also needed to eliminate the effects of the Department's 
delay in producing the promotion procedure. 31 
It concluded that the imposed remedial action was effective, temporary, and 
flexible, because the program applied only to qualified African Americans, provided that 
they were available, and only in instances in which the department had a racial parity 
need to make promotions. The Court concluded that the City's affirmative action 
program was justified and narrowly tailored to meet the District Court's legitimate 
purpose. 32 
The Court found that the race conscious relief ordered by the District Court was 
justified by a compelling governmental interest in eradicating the Department's 
pervasive, systemic, and obstinate discriminatory exclusion of African Americans. The 
Department's deliberate employment discrimination has had a profound effect on the 
state trooper's upper echelon ranks, by excluding African Americans from competing for 
promotions on an equitable basis. 
31 Paradise at 178. 
32James Jones, Jr., "The Origins of Affirmative Action", University of Davis 
Law Review, 414. 
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The enforcement of the consent decree is supported by the societal interest of 
eradicating a persistent, and long standing history of resisting to abide by the terms of the 
order. Remedial relief was only imposed after the Department failed to abide by the 
1979 and 1981 consent decrees. 
The court mandated "one for one" promotional requirement was judged to be 
narrowly tailored to serve the purpose of eradicating racial discrimination in employment 
within the Department. This was true of both the initial corporal promotions and as a 
"continuing contingent" with respect to employment within the upper ranks of the 
Department. 
The numerical relief ordered by the District Court was found to bear a proper 
relation to the percentage of nonminorities in the relevant work force. The District Court 
ordered 50% African American promotions until the ranks achieved 25% African 
American representation, whereas the relevant affirmative action labor pool constituted 
25% representation. This figure represents an attempt to balance the rights and interests 
of all involved parties. 
The "one for one" requirement did not impose an unacceptable burden on non-
minority applicants. The remediation requirement has only been used on one occasion, 
and probably will not be repeated. It doesn't prohibit the employment advancement of 
nonminorities, and does not require the promotion of unqualified African Americans over 
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qualified non-minority applicants. 33 Therefore, the Court deemed the consent decree to 
be flexible, waivable, and temporary in application. 34 
Billish v City of Chicago 
This case centers around the legal principles of the strict scrutiny two prong test 
and sufficient statistical disparity evidence necessary to fulfill the strict scrutiny standard. 
In 1973, the U.S. Department of Justice brought civil action against the City of Chicago, 
herein after referred to as the "City," alleging that the hiring and promotion practices of 
the Chicago Fire Department, herein after referred to as the "CFD", illegally 
discriminated against African Americans and Hispanics. At the time of the suit, African 
Americans and Hispanics comprised a total of less than 5% of the uniformed personnel in 
the CFD. The court entered a interlocutory injunction against the City on the Department 
of Justice's discriminatory hiring claims. The City entered into a consent decree in 1974. 
This established an interim 50% minority hiring ratio and a long range goal requiring the 
City to significantly increase the minority representation of the CFD in a manner directly 
reflecting the minority composition of the City. In 1978, minorities comprised 
approximately 9% of the CFD's uniformed personnel. In 1979, the District Court granted 
a motion to the Department of Justice and ordered that if the new 1979 hiring eligibility 
list was used for more than a two year period or 500 eligible names, 50% of all further 
hiring would be required to be comprised of minority candidates. 
33Paradise at 150-52. 
34Paradise at 178. 
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In 1980, the Department of Justice formally informed the City of its intention to 
file a new suit challenging the proposed promotion examinations due to the possibility of 
it having a severe adverse impact against minority candidates. 
In 1983, the Fire Commissioner ordered the preparation of a new set of 
promotion examinations for each of the fire department ranks. The examinations were 
given in descending rank order: engineer, lieutenant, captain, and battalion chief In 
1987, the Commissioner of Personnel informed the Fire Commissioner that the engineer 
and captain promotions were to be made on an affirmative action basis, with the goal of 
20% of the persons promoted to the engineer rank should be African American, and an 
additional 5% of those promoted were to be of Hispanic origin.35 
White firefighters brought action against the City and various parties. They 
alleged that their rights under the equal protection and due process clauses were violated 
by the City's failure to fill all vacancies before retiring its eligibility list and by its 
nonrank order promotion of minority fire fighters. In another action, white fire fighters 
and their local union brought action challenging the city's affirmative action policy 
regarding promotion. 
The Billish action was brought by nine white firefighters who were next on the 
captain eligibility list when the Fire Commissioner lowered the cut off score to allow the 
two minority lieutenants to be promoted in 1987. The plaintiffs challenged the lowering 
of the cut off score and the subsequent promotions, as well as the Fire Commissioners 
refusal to promote others listed on the 1979 eligibility list. The Chicago Fire Fighters 
35Billish v City of Chicago, 962 F.2d 1269 (7th Cir. 1992) at 1276. 
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suit was brought by the Union and twenty two white firefighters and lieutenants who 
were passed over in the affirmative action engineer and captain promotions in 1987. The 
cases were consolidated. The plaintiffs sued for violation of their rights under the Equal 
Protection Clause. The Billish plaintiffs also asserted a violation of their due process 
rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed one case, and the other case was affirmed in part, 
reversed and remanded in part. 36 
The Court found that the affirmative action policy did not violate principles of 
equal protection; firefighters did not have protected property interest in rank order 
promotions; and the District Court applied incorrect standards in concluding that 
retirement of eligibility list and nonrank order promotion of minority fire fighters did not 
violate principles of equal protection. 
The court applied the Strict Scrutiny Standard to determine whether it violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. The Strict Scrutiny Two Prong Test requires that there must 
be a compelling Governmental interest justifying any racial classification and a 
demonstration that the means selected to effectuate that objective are narrowly tailored to 
meet that goal. 37 Based upon all of the relevant evidence, it was held that the City's 
affirmative action plan didn't meet the strict scrutiny two prong test requirements. The 
court granted the City's motion for summary judgment. 
The Court also decided that the plaintiffs did not have standing to contest the 
suit and dismissed certain plaintiffs for lack of standing. They found that the plaintiffs 
36Billish at 1269-70. 
37Krupa v New Castle County, 732 F. Supp. 497 (D. Del. 1990) at 507. 
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did not suffer any direct injury from the non rank order promotions. The fourteen 
promoted individuals would not have been promoted, even if they were promoted in 
strict rank order. Therefore, the affirmative action plan was necessary. 
It was also found that the measures taken to rectify the effects of past 
discrimination practices within a state or municipality have been recognized by the courts 
to serve as a compelling governmental interest. There must also be a strong basis in 
evidence for the affirmative action to support the remedial action. In this action, the 
plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that the City violated their rights. 38 
The litigation history of the CFD's past hiring and promotion practices 
corroborates evidence of past discrimination. There was also statistical evidence to 
support past discrimination. There was evidence of minority under representation by 
statistical analysis, which was sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement that the 
City be required to have a strong basis for believing that remedial action was required. 39 
The City presented evidence that the difference between the expected percentage of 
minority engineers and the actual percentage of minority engineers was 8. 7 standard 
deviations, and the difference between the expected percentage of minority captains and 
the actual percentage of minority captains was 3.96 standard deviations. The City's 
reliance on under representation statistics as part of the evidence lends support to the 
strong basis for concluding that remedial action was necessary. There was a compelling 
38Billish at 1281. 
39Billish at 1284. 
governmental interest and the affirmative action plan was narrowly tailored to meet the 
goals of the remedial plan. 40 
A due process claim has two components: there must be a protected property 
interest, and the plaintiff must have been deprived of that interest without due process of 
law. The court found that there was insufficient evidence to support the claim that there 
was an existence of a custom or practice by the City to fill vacancies for captain from the 
eligibility list in effect at the time of vacancy. There was insufficient evidence to create a 
genuine issue as to the existence of a property interest in rank order promotion.41 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judt:,'lllent 
on the due process claim. With respect to the equal protection claim, the court remanded 
the case to District Court as opposed to applying the Strict Scrutiny Standard. The Court 
of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for further consideration.42 
Vogel v City of Cincinnati 
This case centers around three legal principles with regard to equal protection 
clause violation. They are the enforceability of a consent decree, legal standing required 
to challenge the enforceability of a consent decree, and the application of the strict 
scrutiny standard to the affirmative action plan. 
40Billish at 1284. 
41Billish at 1300. 
42Billish at 1302. 
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The Department of Justice on behalf of the United States commenced an action 
against the City of Cincinnati, herein after referred to as the "City," the Cincinnati Police 
Division and the Cincinnati Civil Service Commission. They alleged that they had 
engaged in firing and promoting practices that discriminated against minorities and 
women, which was in direct violation of Title VII. The collective bargaining 
representative of the Cincinnati police officers, the Fraternal Order of Police intervened 
in this action. After negotiations, a consent decree was issued. 
The consent decree stated that in order to remedy the past discrimination 
practices, it established a long term goal of having the proportion of African American 
and female police officers directly reflect the approximate proportion of qualified 
African Americans and women in the city's work force. The decree also stated that it 
would terminate this plan as soon as the long term goal of equal employment was 
reached by the Cincinnati Police Division. 43 
According to the decree, a new procedure of hiring police recruits was 
implemented. The plan called for a revised set of minimum score qualifications in which 
candidates scoring at least 60% on the examination were placed on a Open Eligible List. 
The City afforded preference to qualified African American and women when needed to 
meet the interim goals of the consent decree. The decrees established the criteria in 
which the recruits would be composed of 34 % African American and 23 % women. 44 
43Vogel v City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir, 1994)at 596. 
44Vogel at 597. 
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The plaintiff, a white male was not selected to become a member of the October 
1989 recruiting class, however he was selected as a recruit several months later. The 
plaintiff commenced this action against the City seeking restitution of pay, retroactive 
seniority and other benefits for the period in which he was denied a position with the 
force due to the City's hiring policy. He contended that the City went beyond the terms of 
the consent decree by implementing a quota system type of hiring practice. He alleged 
that the hiring policy was not in accordance with the terms of the consent decree which 
stated, than none of the language of the decree should be interpreted as demanding that 
the City hire unnecessary personnel or unqualified employees for available positions or to 
satisfy quota requirements. 45 The plaintiff further contends that if the Police 
Department's hiring policy is authorized by the consent decree, then the consent decree is 
in direct violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court affirmed the summary judgment of the district court dismissing the 
plaintiffs' claim against the City. The Court concluded that a consent decree is a contract 
founded on the principle that there is an agreement reached between the parties. It should 
be designed to preserve the position for which the concerned parties bargained. The 
affirmative action plan is nor enforceable directly or in collateral proceedings by 
individuals who are not parties to the plan. 46 Consequently, the plan can only be 
challenged on the grounds that its substantive provision unlawfully infringed upon the 
45Vogel at 597. 
46Vogel at 598. 
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rights of the party making the complaint.47 In this instance, the plaintiffs sought to 
collaterally enforce the consent decree according to his personal interpretation of the 
decree. The plaintiff was not afforded the right and lacked legal standing to challenge 
the City's interpretation of the consent decree. 
The plaintiff alleged that the consent decree violated the equal protection 
clause. In order to have standing to successfully make a challenge, the plaintiff must be 
aggrieved by the judicial action from which it appeals. 48 Since the plaintiff was denied 
employment as a result of the affirmative action policy adopted by the City pursuant to 
the consent decree, and was not a party to the consent decree, the Court granted the 
plaintiff legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of the decree as it applied to 
h. 49 Im. 
The City's affirmative action plan required only the hiring of qualified African 
Americans and women, it did not forbid non-minorities from employment. The plaintiff 
contended that the affirmative action plan required the selection of unqualified African 
Americans and women over qualified non-minorities. The City's adopted plan was 
considered to be a fair and reasonable policy of affirmative action. The City's affirmative 
action plan survived the strict scrutiny standard because there was strong statistical 
evidence to support the contention that a remedial action was necessary. 50 There was 
47Vogel at 598. 
48Vogel at 599. 
49Vogel at 599. 
-o ) Vogel at 599. 
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evidence of widespread statistical imbalance and disparity demonstrated in the past 
hiring practices of the City. This was true of both the hiring and promotional practices 
enacted for African Americans and women. Therefore, the Court found that the plan 
sought to eradicate the current effects of the City's prior discriminatory hiring practice, 
and found that the affirmative action plan was narrowly tailored to achieve the prescribed 
goals of the consent decree. 51 
California Regents v Bakke 
This case centers around the legal principle of the strict scrutiny standard, racial 
classification, and the burden of proof required to substantiate racial classification. The 
relationship between the requirement of strict judicial scrutiny and violation of the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth amendment is contrasted. 
The Medical School of the University of California at Davis, herein after 
referred to as a the "Medical School", had two admissions programs established for 
entering medical students. One was the regular admissions program and the other was 
the special admissions program, designed for disadvantaged and minority students. The 
terms of the regular admissions program required that the candidate's undergraduate 
grade point average be at least 2.5 or above on a scale of 4.0. Approximately one out of 
six candidates was granted an interview, which was rated on a scale of 1 to 100 by each 
of the committee members. The candidate's ratings were based upon summaries of the 
interviews, overall grade point averages, science course grade averages, MCA T (Medical 
51 Vogel at 601. 
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College Admissions Test) scores, letters of recommendation, extracurricular activities, 
and other biological information pertinent to the applicant. After consideration of all of 
the material was completed, the admissions committed extended offers of admission to 
the candidates judged to be capable of successfully completing medical school. The 
special program was administered by a separate committee. The 1973 and 1974 medical 
school applications included a section on the application that requested the applicant to 
state whether he/she wanted to be considered a member of the "economically 
disadvantaged" or members of a "minority" group. The applicants were rated in a 
different manner than the regular candidates. However, the special admissions 
candidates did not have to meet the 2.5 grade point average criteria that the regular 
admission candidates had to satisfy. 
During a four year period, 63 minority students were admitted to the medical 
school under the terms of the special program and 44 were admitted under the regular 
program. However, no white student who classified themselves as being "disadvantaged" 
was admitted to the special program. 
A white student (Bakke) applied for admission the medical school on two 
occasions. He applied first in 1973 and again in 1974. The student scored 468 out of a 
possible score of 500 on the MCAT in 1973. He scored 549 out of a possible score of 
600 in 1974. The reason that he was rejected in 1973 centered around the fact that the 
respondent applied late in the admissions process and no general applicants with scores 
less than 4 70 were accepted at the time that the respondent's application was processed 
and completed. During the 1973 submission, four special admissions slots were unfilled 
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at the time that the respondent's application was rejected. In 1974, Even though the 
respondent applied early in the admissions process, he was rejected for an undisclosed 
reason. It is also found that in neither year was his name placed on the discretionary 
waiting list, nor admitted to the special program. 
The respondent filed this action after being rejected for the second time. He 
filed this action in state court for mandatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief to compel 
his admission to the Medical School of the University of California at Davis. The 
respondent alleged that the medical school's admission program operated to exclude him 
from admission consideration on the basis of his race and in violation of the respondent's 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a provision of the California 
Constitution, and§ 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
The Trial Court found that the special admissions program acted as a racial 
quota system, because the students competing in the special program competed against 
each other as opposed to competing with all admissions candidates in both the regular 
and special admissions programs. The Trial Court also held that the admissions program 
operated as a quota system, because the candidates being considered in this program had 
16 out of 100 admissions seats reserved specifically for them, It held that the special 
program violated the Federal and State Constitutions and Title VI because the petitioner 
(school) was prohibited from taking race into consideration in making admissions 
decisions. The California Supreme Court held that the school's admission process under 
the special program violated the Federal and State Constitutions and Title VI and ordered 
the admittance of the respondent to the medical school. 
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed the California Supreme Court 
decision and ordered the respondent's admission into the medical school and invalidated 
the petitioner's special admissions program. However, it reversed the California Supreme 
Court's decision with respect to special program admission. It prohibited the petitioner 
from taking race into consideration as a factor in its future admissions decisions. 52 
The court found that racial classification is inherently suspect, requiring strict 
judicial scrutiny. 53 The Strict Scrutiny Standard requires that there must be a "compelling 
governmental interest to justify any racial classification and a showing that the means 
selected to effectuate that objective be narrowly tailored to meet that goal. 54 The Court 
sympathized with the Medical School at the University of California at Davis's goal of 
achieving racial diversity on the campus. The Court even held that attempting to achieve 
racial diversity among the student body is sufficiently compelling to justify consideration 
of race in admissions decisions under some circumstances. The petitioner's (medical 
school's) special admissions program, which forecloses consideration to people similar to 
the respondent, is unnecessary to the achievement of this compelling goal. Therefore, it 
makes it invalid under the terms of the equal protection clause. 55 
The United States Supreme Court also rationed that the petitioner was unable to 
satisfy the burden of proof that was required to prove that the respondent would not have 
52California Regents v Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) at 265-66. 
53Bakke at 26 7. 
54Krupa at 507. 
55Bakke at 267. 
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been considered for admission even if there had not been a special admissions program 
implemented by the medical school. 56 
Krupa v New Castle County 
This case centers around the legal principles of the strict scrutiny two prong test, 
statistical disparity, and due process of law. 
White police officers filed an employment discrimination claim challenging 
Delaware County's Police Department, herein after referred to as the "County," 
promotion of a African American police officer. The police department's policy dictated 
that after serving as a patrolman for 12 years, automatic promotion to the corporal level 
is automatically granted. The Delaware statute states that patrolmen are afforded the 
right to seek command position promotions. Promotions are based upon competitive 
d fi 
. . 57 
competency an tness exammatlons. 
The County and the Fraternal Order of Police, New Castle County Lodge No. 5 
(the plaintiffs' collective bargaining agent) entered into an agreement inter alia, that a 
merit system be utilized by the County in accordance with the affirmative action plan. 
The County's objective was to impose equitable supervisory promotions to qualified 
women and/or minorities, provided that they possess a validated promotional tool to be 
utilized in making the promotion decisions. 58 
56Bakke at 265-66. 
57Krupa at 499. 
58Krupa at 499. 
6! 
§ 1183 (a)( 1) of Title 9 of the Delaware Code provides, inter alia that it was 
illegal to either favor or discriminate against individuals applying for County positions on 
the basis of race, color, national origin, political, religious opinions, or affiliations. 59 
The affirmative action plan stated that when a sergeant's position became 
available, the only applicants to be considered for the County promotional consideration 
would be those applicants who were placed in the first band. It was also stipulated that 
even those applicants who were not in the first band would be considered qualified for 
the sergeant's position, provided that no one applied from a protected class group, who 
was also a member of the certified list of groups. Protected class members are defined as 
including minorities, physically challenged individuals, and women. If there were not any 
protected class members on the certified list, then the 3 highest ranking members of the 
protected class from a lower band would be added to the certification list. The Chief of 
Police had the discretion to select any one of those individuals on the certification list for 
the available position. 
During the 1984 list, the plaintiffs applied for the sergeant position. There were 
six minorities eligible to take the examination. Eighty five people passed the exam. 
Band 1 did not include any members of the protected class. Consequently, protected 
class members from lower bands were added to the certification list. Two positions were 
given to white males scoring originally in Band 1. The third position was given to 
59§1183 (a) (1) of Title 9 of the Delaware Code. 
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Officer Bryant, an African American man who had scored between the 45th and 69th 
percentile on the certification list and placed in the third band. 60 
The 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause states that States are prohibited 
from enforcing or creating legislation denying equal protection of the laws under the 
constitution.61 In this instance, the Strict Scrutiny Standard was applied to the County's 
affirmative action plan. This standard was applicable to affirmative action plans that 
were challenged regardless of whether the challengers were members of the protected 
class.62 The standard requires that there must be a "compelling governmental interest to 
justify any racial classification and a showing that the means selected to effectuate that 
objective are narrowly tailored to meet that goal.63 
There must be a constitutional showing justifying the County's affirmative 
action plan. Public employers are required to identify racial discrimination, public or 
private, with some specificity, before they are allowed to use race conscious remediation. 
Due to the absence of evidence demonstrating prior discrimination in hiring by the 
County, they could not justify the promotion plan that was based upon raw general 
population statistical imbalance. There was no prior evidence of past governmental 
discrimination, therefore the plan was considered unconstitutional.64 
6° Krupa at 499. 
61U.S. Constitution amend. XIV,§ 1. 
62Krupa at 497. 
63Krupa at 507. 
64Krupa at 511. 
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The plaintiffs were denied summary judgment on § 1983 because it had already 
been determined that the plaintiffs' Equal Protection Clause rights under the Fourteenth 
amendment were violated. It was not necessary to prove that a violation of due process 
had occurred. The Court held that in instances where an alleged act of discrimination 
does not concern the impairment of [the making and enforcement of contracts] § 1981 
"d l" f 65 prov1 es no re ie . 
The District Court granted the County's motion for summary judgment with 
respect to the plaintiffs claims under section 1981. The Court also granted the plaintiffs 
motion for summary judgment with respect to the equal protection clause violation. The 
Court held that the County's Plan was unconstitutional, because of the Equal Protection 
Clause violation, which is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 
However, the County's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's section 1983 was 
denied.66 
Jansen v City of Cincinnati 
This case centers around the enforcement of a consent decree and evidence 
supporting the strict scrutiny test requirements. These are necessary when deciding the 
constitutionality of an affirmative action plan. 
The facts of the case surround the issue of white firefighter candidates filing 
action claiming that their constitutional rights were violated when the city continued to 
65Krupa at 519. 
66Krupa at 520-21. 
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use the provision set forth in a consent decree to assure that a certain percentage of 
minority representation was achieved. The consent decree set forth various measures to 
be taken by the City of Cincinnati, herein after referred to as the "City," for the purpose 
of integrating minorities into the fire department The consent decree mandated the 
pursuance of an overall work force composed of 18% minority representation. 67 
The Rule of Three does not guarantee employment to candidates ranking highest 
on the eligibility list, however it does guarantee employment consideration. The 
plaintiffs contend that because they scored higher than any of the minorities appointed, 
that they should have been hired by the fire department The plaintiffs sought restitution 
relief in the form of immediate job placement and back pay starting from the day of the 
alleged discrimination. 68 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dissolved the 
hiring provision in the decree. Upon appeal, the US. Court of Appeals vacated the 
decision and remanded the case to the District Court. 
The Court found that the dual lists did not abridge the plaintiffs constitutional 
rights, because each of the minorities that were placed on the eligible list was qualified to 
be hired by the fire department They had successfully completed each of the five 
evaluation components. 
constitutional. 69 
Therefore, the Court found that the dual lists were 
67Jansen v City of Cincinnati, 977 F.2d 238 (6th Cir. 1992)at 239. 
68Jansen at 241. 
69 Jansen at 24 L 
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The Court found that the continued effectiveness of the consent decree 
depended upon whether the Department had operated in good faith with the 
desegregation decree since its inception, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination 
had been eliminated to the fullest extent possible. 70 The Court of Appeals found that the 
numerical goals established within the consent decree helped to strengthen the overall 
objectives of the decree. The Appeals Court found that the District Court erred when it 
neglected past claims of discrimination. It failed to determine whether the vestiges of 
past discrimination had been eliminated to the fullest extent possible. 71 The Court felt 
that the goals of the consent decree had not been met and should remain in effect until 
they were satisfied. 
The next six cases concern the issue of Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VII 
violations. 
Title VII 
A Title VII violation is a violation of the constitutional rights afforded to U.S. 
citizens under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under Title VII, preferential gender and/or 
racial based treatment and racial and/or gender quotas are banned. Quotas are only 
required in instances where the courts have judged an organization guilty of perpetuating 
past discrimination practices. 72 
70Jansen at 244. 
71 Jansen at 246. 
72Harry E. Groves and Albert Broderick, "Affirmative Action Goals Under Title 
VII: Statute, Legislative History, and Policy," Thurgood Marshall Law Review, 29. 
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Under Title VII, an affirmative action plan must be justified by the existence of 
a "manifest imbalance" in a traditionally segregated job category. 73 Once this imbalance 
is demonstrated, the court is required to consider whether the rights of the person 
discriminated against are "unnecessarily trammeled" by the affirmative action plan. 74 The 
normal method of establishing an intentional discrimination claim under Title VII, 
consists of providing initial proof of a prima facie case and corresponding evidence to 
support the burden of proof provided by the plaintiff. 75 However, in instances in which 
the plaintiff provides direct evidence of discrimination, however, strict adherence to the 
McDonnell Douglass test is not required. 76 The Supreme Court has approved of the 
general analytical outline of McDonnell Douglass to the extent that it requires the 
employer to demonstrate a nondiscriminatory rationale, such as the existence of an 
affirmative action plan, as the basis for supporting a facially discriminatory decision. 77 
The following six cases outline affirmative action cases alleging violation of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
1452. 
73Johnson v Transportation Agency of Santa Clara, 107 S.Ct. 1442 (1987) at 
74Johnson at 1455. 
75McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S .. 792, 802-04 (1981). 
76Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). 
77 Johnson at 616. 
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Johnson v Transportation Agency Santa Clara County 
This is the case that is held in comparison when deciding whether an affirmative 
action plan is in violation of Title VII. The Supreme Court decided that judicial scrutiny 
is utilized in instances in which there is clarification needed to determine whether an 
affirmative action plan is remedial or motivated by unfounded notions of racial 
inferiority or racial politics. 78 In making this determination, the Court developed a two 
prong test to judge the validity of the plan. The test stipulates that ( 1) the racial 
classification used in drafting the plan must be justified by a compelling governmental 
interest; and (2) the means chosen by the State must be narrowly tailored to remedy the 
current effects of past vestiges of racial discrimination. 79 The legal principles involved 
are the strict scrutiny two prong test and manifest imbalance. 
The Court concluded that there must be substantial evidence to support the 
State's determination that remedial measures are appropriate and that other alternative 
measures have been explored. 80 In making this determination, evidence of gross 
statistical imbalances with regard to minority or gender representation is sufficient to 
satisfy a Title VII prima facie requirement. 81 
In this case, the Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, herein after 
referred to as the "Agency," established an affirmative action plan designed to remedy 
78Jansen at 244. 
79Jansen at 246. 
80Vogel at 599. 
81Hazelwood School District v U.S., 433 U.S. 299. 
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past segregation practices with regard to hiring and promoting minorities and females. 
This was a voluntary affirmative action plan. The plan provided inter alia, that in 
deciding on promotions for traditionally segregated positions that have significantly been 
underrepresented by women, the Agency was authorized to consider the sex of a 
qualified applicant for the position. The plan did not have a scope detailing the specific 
number of minorities and/or females positions to be set aside. However the plan required 
that short-range goals be established and annually adjusted for a more accurate guide 
reflecting employment decisions. The Agency announced the position vacancy of road 
dispatcher. When this announcement was made, none of the positions listed under the 
job categorization of "Skilled Craft Worker" was held by a woman. During the review 
process, two qualified candidates were considered for the position. One was a male and 
the other considered was a female. Both were considered well qualified for the position. 
The female notified the County's Affirmative Action Office because she believed that her 
employment consideration would have received unfavorable reviews. 
The Affirmative Action Office responded by contacting the Agency Affirmative 
Action Coordinator, whom the Agency's plan held responsible for keeping the Director 
abreast of affirmative action opportunities for the Agency to accomplish under its plan's 
objectives. During this time, the Agency did not have any women employed in any 
Skilled Craft position, and had never employed a woman as a road dispatcher. The 
Affirmative Action Coordinator recommended to the Director of the Agency to promote 
the female candidate. The female candidate was promoted to the position of road 
dispatcher. 
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The petitioner, a male employee who was passed over for promotion in favor of 
the female employee brought Title VII action against the Agency. He filed a complaint 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that he had been denied 
the promotion on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII. 
The Court found that the petitioner bore the burden of establishing the invalidity 
of the Agency's Affirmative Action Plan. After the plaintiff had established a prima facie 
case that either racial and/or gender classifications had been taken into account in an 
employer's employment decision, the burden shifted to the employer [defendant] to bear 
the burden of articulating a nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision. 82 The existence 
of the affirmative action plan provided the rationale basis for the satisfaction of the 
burden of proof requirement. 
The consideration of the sex of the applicants for the specific job is considered 
to be justified if a "manifest imbalance" exists that reflects the under representation of 
women in job categories that are traditionally segregated. In determining whether an 
imbalance exists that would justify the consideration of sex or race, a statistical 
comparison of the employer's labor force percentage of minorities or women with the 
percentage of minorities and/or women available in the area labor market or general 
population is appropriate in analyzing jobs that require special training. 83 However, in 
this case the comparison involved a job that required special training. The comparison 
82Johnson at 1448. 
83Johnson at 1452. 
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must be made between those in the labor force who possess the relevant qualifications 
sought for the position with those employed by the employer. 
The requirement that the "manifest imbalance" relates to a traditionally 
segregated job category assures that racial and/or gender preferential treatment factors 
will be taken into account in a manner consistent with Title VII's purpose of eliminating 
the effects of employment discrimination, and that the interests of non-minority or male 
employees not benefiting from the plan would not be unduly infringed upon. 84 In this 
case, the plan directed that annual short-term goals be formulated to provide a more 
realistic indication of the degree to which sex should be taken into account in filling the 
position in question. 
The affirmative action plan stipulated that the established goals for each 
division should not be construed as quota requirements to be achieved. 85 However the 
plan authorized that consideration be given to affirmative action concerns when 
evaluating the quality of applicants. The Agency's plan had the express intention of 
attaining a balanced work force, but not maintaining it in perpetuity. The Agency's plan 
required that women compete with all qualified candidates, not simply other women. No 
applicant was automatically excluded from consideration, because all candidates were 
weighed against those of the other candidates. There was substantial evidence to support 
the fact that the Agency sought to take a moderate step towards eliminating the 
imbalance in its female and minority work force. This was considered to be a realistic 
84Johnson at 1452. 
85 Johnson at 1455 
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approach towards guidance for employment decisions, while providing minimal intrusion 
on the legitimate expectations of other employees. The Agency did not earmark any 
positions, because sex was only one of the criteria that was taken into account in 
evaluating qualified applicants for positions. The Agency had no intention of 
maintaining a system whose work force composition was dictated by rigid numerical 
standards. 86 
The decision to promote the female candidate for the position was not dictated 
by the sole factor of her gender. The decision to promote her was made pursuant to an 
affirmative action plan that represented a moderate, flexible, case-by-case approach to 
effectuating a gradual improvement in the representation of minorities and women in the 
Agency's work force. The plan was fully consistent with Title VII, because it contains all 
of the contribution that voluntary employer action can make in eliminating the vestiges of 
discrimination in the workplace. 87 Even though race is considered as a classification 
necessitating the application of the strict scrutiny standard, gender is not considered 
suspect. Gender violations are judged by using a intermediate constitutional standard. 88 
Firefighters v Stotts 
The legal principle involved in this case concerns a bona fide seniority plan, the 
enforcement of a consent decree, and the scope of judicial authority. 
86Johnson at 1457. 
87Johnson at 1457. 
88 Johnson at 1457. 
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The respondent in this case was an African American member of the Memphis 
Tennessee Fire Department, herein after referred to as the "Department." The respondent 
and another petitioner charged that the Department and certain other city officials 
engaged in practices of making hiring and promotion decisions on the basis of race in 
violation of inter alia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.89 A consent decree was 
entered with the purpose of remedying the Department's minority hiring and promotion 
practices, as it related to African American employees. 
The District Court entered and approved an order preliminary enjoining the 
Department from abiding by its seniority system in making the determination as to who 
would be laid off as a result of financial constraints, since the proposed cuts would have 
a racially discriminatory effect and the seniority system was not a bona fide system. 
The Department presented a modified layoff plan, which was directed at 
protecting African American employees, which was court approved. Layoffs pursuant to 
the modified plan were then enacted. The result of this action caused white employees 
with more seniority than African American employees to be laid off, whereas the 
alternative seniority system would have called for the layoffs of African American 
employees with less seniority. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and held that 
even though the District Court erred in holding that the seniority system was not a bona 
89Chicago Firefighters, 736 F.Supp. at 929. 
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fide one, it had properly acted in modifying the consent decree. However, the Supreme 
Court reversed the court decision. 90 
The Supreme Court held that the case was not moot provided that the parties 
involved have a concrete interest in the outcome of the litigation. 91 The Court believed 
that a month's salary was not a negligible item for those affected by the injunction, and 
the loss of a month's competitive seniority might determine who gets future promotions, 
and who is laid off if there are future staff reductions. 
The Department's plan was considered a bona fide plan. The City was not at 
fault for following the seniority plan expressed in its agreement with the union. The 
Court of Appeals proposed a settlement theory, advocating that the strong policy favoring 
voluntary settlement of Title VII actions permitted consent decrees that encroached on 
seniority systems. 92 However the Supreme Court held that this theory was inapplicable 
when there wasn't a settlement with respect to the disputed issue. The approved decree 
didn't award competitive seniority to the minority system. 
The District Court enjoined the City of Memphis from applying a seniority 
policy in a manner that would decrease the percentage of African Americans employed 
by the Memphis Fire Department. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
decision, concluding that the injunction was an appropriate remedy for enforcing the 
90Inter alia literally means "among other things." Oran's Dictionary of the Law, 
Daniel Oran, J.D., 1983. 
91 Powell v McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1986) at 496-98. 
92McCormack at 496-98. 
80 
consent decree. The Court concluded that the District Court's injunction was invalid 
regardless of the intent to enforce the terms of the consent decree. 93 
According to the majority Supreme Court opinion, the primary issue concerned 
whether the District Court exceeded its judicial authority when it issued a preliminary 
injunction that required white employees to be laid off when other applicable seniority 
systems would have called for the layoff of less senior African American employees. 94 
The Court majority dissented with the Court of Appeals assessment that the consent 
decree modification was within the judicial authority of the District Court. The Court 
concluded that the City of Memphis didn't consent to be enjoined from making layoffs 
which decreased the percentage of African American employees. The modification 
altered the application of the seniority system and was held to be outside of the 
jurisdictional authority of the Court. Although the consent decree in this case didn't 
include retroactive seniority, the Court placed a lot of emphasis on the fact that there was 
no evidence that any African Americans protected from layoffs had been victims of 
discrimination. Therefore, there was no award of competitive seniority made to any of 
them. The Court perceived the modification to be an infringement on the vested 
seniority rights of non-minority firefighters. The Court majority considered a 
requirement of discriminatory proof by the plaintiffs, being consistent with Title VII's 
93James Jones, Jr., "The Origins of Affirmative Action", University of Davis 
Law Review, 411. 
94Louise Jackson Williams, "Last Hired, First Fired - Rights Without Remedies: 
Firefighters v Stotts", Detroit Col1ege of Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 215, 1985, 230. 
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"make whole" provision, regardless of the fact that the plaintiffs didn't request make 
whole relief in the consent decree. 95 
Surprisingly, the Court decision did not mention methods of enforcing the 
consent decree or how it would effect the plaintiffs rights under the decree. Three 
Justices dissented in their court opinion, considering the issue to be moot because the 
issue was no longer controversial or in question. They concluded that the Court should 
have considered the issue of whether the fire department's proposed layoffs violated the 
terms of the consent decree. The justices considered the focus of addressing the wrong 
issue to be a fundamental procedural error. 96 
Gonzales v Police Department. City of San Jose 
This case involves the legal principles of consent decree enforcement and 
statistical disparity evidence. 
The plaintiff-appellant, an Hispanic police officer appealed a judgment denying 
his claim of racial discrimination. He sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. The plaintiff had been employed by the Police Department of the City of San Jose, 
herein after referred to as the "Department." During the course of the officer's twelve 
year tenure, the plaintiff had received over thirty written commendations, had varied 
work assignments, and had passed both the oral and written examinations qualifying him 
95Louise Jackson Williams, "Last Hired, First Fired - Rights Without Remedies: 
Firefighters v Stotts", Detroit College of Law Review, 232. 
96Louise Jackson Williams, "Last Hired, First Fired - Rights Without Remedies: 
Firefighters v Stotts", Detroit College of Law Review, 234. 
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for promotionability. The promotion list was effective for a two year period. The City of 
San Jose, California, herein after referred to as the "City," adopted an affirmative action 
plan to eradicate racial imbalances in employment. 
The plaintiff was a member of the protected class and the provisions of the plan 
were in effect at the time that he sought promotion to the rank of sergeant. The 
Department on four separate occasions failed to promote the plaintiff There is evidence 
to support the case that from 1980-1982, one out of eleven Hispanic officers was 
promoted to sergeant. There is also evidence to support the contention that the 
Department failed to comply with the requirement to notify the City's Affirmative Action 
Officer in writing in each instance in which it promoted a non-minority over the plaintiff 
The District Court judge made no mention of the affirmative action plan, and relied upon 
promotion rates for Hispanics during the period after the appellant filed his complaint, 
which showed an increase in Hispanic representation when he rendered the court 
decision. 97 
The Court majority held that the District Court failed to take into account the 
fact that there was substantial evidence to support the fact that there were material, 
uncontroverted and repeated violations of San Jose's Affirmative Action Plan. Even 
though there was an affirmative action plan in place which required the City to notify the 
Affirmative Action Officer when positions became available, the City refused to comply 
with the requirement. The City continued to promote nonminorities over the plaintiff 
and failed to comply with the terms of the consent decree on four separate occasions. 
97Firefighters v Stotts, 104 S.Ct 2576 (1984) at 2576. 
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This was sufficient evidence to support the plaintiff's allegation that his rights under 
Title VII had been violated. 
Gonzales discussed the City's reluctance to comply with the terms of the 
mandatory consent decree during his post trial brief, and also included a detailed 
discussion of the discrimination issue. However, the District Court failed to note this in 
the Court record. The Court found that even though there was substantial evidence to 
support the contention that there was an affirmative action plan violation, the failure to 
adhere to the terms of an affirmative action plan was not a per se prima facie violation of 
Title VII. 98 
Each time that the City failed to comply with the Title VII requirements, the 
Affirmative Action Officer became empowered to request that the Department change its 
promotion decision and to refer the matter to the City Manager if the Department refused 
to change its decision. There was no mention of the Department's violation within the 
testimony, supporting the contention that the District Court erred in not considering a 
highly relevant and probative aspect of the case. 99 
The District Court's second error concerned the fact that it relied on statistical 
evidence which supported the contention that the Police Department had a generally 
good record with regard to the promotion of Hispanics from June 1977 to March 1987. 
The problem with taking this evidence into account, is the fact that most of the evidence 
98Yatvin v Madison Metropolitan School Dist., 840 F.2d 412 at 415-16. 
99Gonzales v Police Department, City of San Jose, California, 901 F.2d 758 (9th 
Cir. 1990) at 760. 
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the Court considered concerns a period after Gonzales filed his initial complaint, and is 
therefore considered irrelevant Minority employees were promoted just prior to the trial, 
not during the time that the plaintiff experienced flagrant discrimination. This fact did 
not support the defendant, nor did it render the case moot There was evidence to 
support the fact that such efforts as increasing the representation of an underrepresented 
group were deemed to be equivocal in purpose, motive, and permanence, and therefore 
taken into account when deciding upon the validity of the case. 100 Statistical evidence 
should not have been taken into consideration, and it was the opinion of the Court that 
the District Court erred when it relied upon the statistical findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. Consequently, the decision was vacated and the case was remanded to the 
District Court for reconsideration. 101 
Hammon v Barry 
This case concerns the Title Vil legal principles of legal standing to challenge 
the affirmative action plan and manifest imbalance of the racial composition of the 
workplace. 
This is a challenge to an Affirmative Action Plan employed by a fire 
department. The U.S. District Court upheld race conscious hiring provisions and an 
100Gamble v Birmingham Southern Railroad Co., 514 F.2d 678, 683 (5th Cir. 
1975) (quoting Johnson v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491F.2d1364, 1376-77 n. 36 
(5th Cir. 1974) 
101Gonzales at 760-62. 
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appeal was taken. The District of Columbia Fire Department hired African Americans 
for entry level positions on average 50% per year since 1969. Since 19 81, an average of 
75+ % of hired fire fighters have been African American. As of 1984, 37% of the fire 
fighting force was African American. The appellant alleges that the relevant labor force 
consists of persons between the ages of 20-28 years old, who were located within the 
boundaries of the District of Columbia, but not within the Washington metropolitan area. 
The Court initially upheld race conscious hiring, noting the Johnson v Agency of 
Santa Clara case. Then the decision was reversed upon appeal. The United States Court 
of Appeals has denied the petition for rehearing, letting the appealed decision not to 
uphold race conscious hiring decision stand. 102 
The Court found that in instances where there is an alleged violation based upon 
the same set of facts, the statutory and constitutional issues are closely interwoven for 
review. Therefore, there is standing to challenge the constitutionality of the affirmative 
action plan's hiring provisions, with respect to Title VII and ancillary constitutional 
claims under the 5th and 14th amendment. The Attorney General is granted authority to 
bring suit providing there is justification to support the belief that individuals engaged in 
patterns of restricting another person's constitutional guarantees, secured by [Title VII], 
and that the practice is of a nature that is intended to deny the full exercise of the rights, 
the Attorney General may bring a civil action in an effort to request the relief that he/she 
102Hammon v Barry, 826 F.2d 73 (1987) at 73. 
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deems appropriate to msure the full enjoyment of the individual's constitutional 
guarantees. 103 
Even though, there was an undisputed fact that the Department was officially 
segregated in the 1950's, as of 4/84, 37% of the District of Columbia firefighters were 
African American. It is irrelevant that the overwhelming majority of African American 
fire fighters hailed from the Washington Metropolitan area, as opposed to the inner city. 
There is no "manifest imbalance", because there is no suggestion that the Department 
acted in a discriminatory fashion by hiring from the entire metropolitan area. Hiring is 
based upon mandatory racial quotas imposed by the federal government, as opposed to 
select geographical areas. 104 It was irrelevant that the overwhelming majority of African 
American fire fighters hailed from the Washington Metropolitan area, as opposed to the 
inner city. 
Local 93 v City of Cleveland 
This case centers around the legal principle of enforcement of a voluntary 
affirmative action plan. 
An association of African American and Hispanic fire fighters brought a class 
action suit against the City to redress alleged past and present discrimination practices by 
the city fire department in promotional practices. Due to failed negotiations regarding the 
adoption of a consent decree, the local 93 union intervened in the matter. The District 
103Hammon at 82. 
104Hammon at 77. 
Court for the Northern District of Ohio adopted the consent degree, and the labor union 
appealed the decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and a writ of certiori 
was requested by the local union. 105 The petition for certiori was granted by the United 
States Supreme Court. 106 
The Court found that the Title VII enforcement provision, which precludes the 
Court from entering an order requiring an employer to grant relief to an employee who 
suffered adverse job action if action was taken for any reason other than discrimination 
on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin does not preclude entry of 
consent decree that may benefit individuals who are not actual victims of an employer's 
discriminatory practices. 107 The section was further clarified to be interpreted as meaning 
that employers may make employment considerations for any reason, except when such 
decisions violate the substantive provisions of Title VII. 108 Therefore, the extent of the 
limitations placed upon all of the parties and the federal court to ensure that the 
provisions are being met, did not restrict the employer or unions from entering into 
voluntary affirmative action plans ensuring the implementation of the consent decree. A 
consent is not an order within meaning of enforcement provision of Title VII, the limits 
105Writ of certiori literally means "'To make sure." It is a writ from the Higher 
Court asking the lower court for the court record. Oran's Dictionary of the Law, Daniel 
Oran, J.D., 1983. 
106Local 93 Int'l Assn. Firefighters v City of Cleveland, 106 S.Ct. 3063 ( 1986) at 
3063. 
107Local 93 at 3063. 
108Local 93 at 3075. 
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of the agreement are found outside of the section. Intervening union's consent was not 
required to obtain court approval of a consent decree. An intervenor is allowed to 
present evidence and to have its objections made public, however, it does not have the 
authority to act as an impediment to the adoption of the consent decree merely by 
~ . h d 109 re1usmg to grant consent to t e ecree. 
The Department's plan was considered a bona fide plan. The City was not at 
fault for following the seniority plan expressed in its agreement with the union. The 
Court of Appeals proposed a settlement theory, that the strong policy favoring voluntary 
settlement of Title VII actions permitted consent decrees that encroached on seniority 
systems. 110 However, the Supreme Court held that this theory was inapplicable when 
there wasn't a settlement with respect to the disputed issue. The approved decree didn't 
award competitive seniority to the minority system. The Title VII enforcement provision 
which precluded the court from entering an order requiring an employer to grant relief to 
an employee who suffered adverse job action, provided that the action was taken for any 
reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin 
does not preclude entry of a consent decree that may benefit individuals who are not 
actual victims of employer's discriminatory practices. 111 
109Local 93 at 3079. 
110Stotts at 2576. 
111Local 93 at 3063. 
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Andrews v City of Johnstown 
The legal principle involved is the enforcement of an affirmative action plan. 
The facts of the case found that upon recommendation made by the Department head to 
the Mayor of Johnstown, the City of Johnstown hired a white individual for the position 
of Enterprise Development Coordinator. The plaintiff provided proof that he had 
maintained a resume on file with the City's Affirmative Action Council Officer. The 
plaintiff met all of the qualification criteria, however the position was given to a lesser 
qualified white applicant. As pursuant to a policy adopted by the City of Johnstown, the 
plan required that the City's Affirmative Action Officer receive notification of job 
openings at least five days prior to any action being taken regarding appointments. 
In this case, neither was the Affirmative Action Officer notified, nor was the 
position advertised in any local publication. The plaintiff received notice of the position 
availability after reading the appointment announcement notice that was placed in the 
local newspaper. The plaintiff argued that had he known about the availability of the 
position, he would have applied for the position. However, the City failed to follow its 
own plan in hiring for the position in question. The plaintiff filed a timely charge of 
discrimination with the EEOC, and the EEOC in tum rendered a right to sue letter to the 
defendant. 112 
The Court opinion held that the position was not within the classification of 
positions that would be ordinarily exempted because of it being a political appointment. 
The evidence did not support the claim that the position was a policy making position, 
112 Andrews v City of Johnstown, 669 F. Supp. 127 (W.D. Pa. 1987) at 128. 
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therefore making it exempt under affirmative action. It was a ministerial position 
requiring the authorization of the Enterprise Development Area Initiative. 113 
Some cases challenge both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Cases Involving Equal Protection Clause and Title VII Violation 
Allegations 
The remaining two cases concern claims against the Fourteenth amendments 
Equal Protection Clause and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. These cases 
specifically address the issue of the violation meeting the requirement of the Strict 
Scrutiny Two Prong test and manifest imbalance. 
Analysis of a claim of an equal protection violation is made by utilizing the 
"Strict Scrutiny Two Prong" test. The standard stipulates that preference given to 
minorities in affirmative action court decisions must be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest that is achieved only through narrowly tailored means. Court 
sanctioned preferential employment consideration are required to serve a compelling 
governmental interest of remedying past vestiges of racial and/or gender discrimination. 
Analysis of a Title VII claim requires that an affirmative action plan be justified 
by the existence of a "manifest imbalance" in a traditionally segregated job category. 114 
Once this imbalance is demonstrated, the court is required to consider whether the rights 
of the person discriminated against were "unnecessarily trammeled" by implementation 
113 Andrews at 129. 
114Johnson at 1452. 
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of the affirmative action plan. 115 In order to establish an intentional discrimination claim 
under Title VII, the plaintiff must provide initial proof of a prima facie case and 
corresponding evidence to support the burden of proof 116 
Cunico v Pueblo School District 
This case involves both the equal protection clause challenge and a Title VII 
challenge. This case concerns the principles of law: Strict Scrutiny Two Prong Test and 
manifest imbalance. 
The facts of this case state that the plaintiff, a white social worker was 
employed by the Colorado Board of Education, herein after referred to as the "Board." 
Her status during the 1981-82 school year was tenured. The plaintiff testified that she 
understood the term, "tenure" to imply that she had received jobs security within her 
position. 
The Board found it necessary to reduce its work force due to financial 
difficulties during the 1981-82 school year. In order to minimize the amount of 
disruption of actual classrooms, the district initially decided to cancel all social worker 
contracts throughout the district. The Board modified the decision upon learning that 
state law required the retention of at least two social workers. 
The Board developed a policy governing its reduction in force decisions, which 
included a written policy and appeal procedure. The policy also provided during such 
115Johnson at 1455. 
116McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S .. 792, 802-04 ( 1981 ). 
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reduction in force actions, the District would make a reasonable effort to maintain at 
least a percentage of minority teachers employed by the District. The contracts of the 
terminated teachers within each area were scheduled to be canceled according to the 
seniority of their probationary status, and then followed by the least tenured teachers. 
Accordingly, all six social worker's contracts were canceled and each requested 
separate hearings. They retained the two most senior social workers. One of the social 
workers, a African American man objected to his contract cancellation, on grounds that 
he believed that the District had engaged in discriminatory practices by excluding 
African Americans from administrative level positions within the district. The Board 
·accepted the hearing officers recommendations to retain the African American social 
worker and rescinded the termination of his contract. 
The plaintiff brought discriminatory action after the school district decided to 
retain the less senior African American social worker, as well as the contract of a 
Hispanic social worker. The plaintiff was eventually rehired, but filed a complaint with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging discrimination. She exhausted 
her appeals and initiated a federal suit. 
The District Court of Colorado entered judgment for the plaintiff, but reduced 
the plaintiffs' award. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that: ( l) the decision to rehire 
African American social workers after discharging two senior teachers was unjustified 
and constituted discriminatory action against plaintiff who had more seniority (2) back 
93. 
pay was an appropriate remedial award, (3) appeal was not groundless at to justify 
objective bad faith while supporting award of appellate attorney fees to plaintiff. 117 
The Court found that there was no compelling governmental interest, therefore 
it failed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test. The action was unjustifiable. There 
must have been a "manifest imbalance" where the rights of an individual are 
unnecessarily trammeled by implementation of the affirmative action plan. The 
preference must be justified by a compelling governmental interest that is achieved only 
via narrowly tailored means. There was no evidence of past discriminatory practices. 
The threat of loss of federal funding is not considered to be a compelling interest. There 
was no statistical imbalance present to support the contention that this was evidentiary of 
past discrimination practices. The African American employee was retained solely 
because of an established racial criterion imposed by the Board. 118 
Ledoux v District of Columbia 
The case centers around the legal principles of strict scrutiny and manifest 
imbalance. The case challenges both the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
amendment and Title VII. 
The facts of the case state that non-minority and male employees who were 
denied promotions within the police department brought suit challenging the 
department's affirmative action plan in place designed to place special emphasis on the 
117Cunico v Pueblo School District No. 60, 917 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1990) at 
431. 
118Cunico at 436-440. 
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hiring and advancement of females and minorities in areas where there was an obvious 
imbalance in minority employment. Several hundred Grade lI Detective positions 
became available, however none of the appellants were ultimately selected for this 
position. Believing that their failure to obtain promotions was related to illegal 
preferential treatment, they failed discrimination charges with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission. They alleged inter alia ("among other things"), 119 that they 
were denied promotions in violation of Title VII and the due process clause of the Fifth 
amendment. After a bench trial, the District Court concluded that the challenged 
promotions pursuant to a voluntary affirmative action plan was valid and entered in favor 
of the appellees. 120 
The Court determined that the voluntary affirmative action plan must be 
justified as a remedial course of action and it must not unnecessarily trammel the 
legitimate interests of non-minority employees. The court can sanction under both Title 
VII and the Constitution, the authorization to give greater weight to a minority or female 
applicant who is qualified to do the job, which is the manifest imbalance. Because the 
voluntary affirmative action plan did not have an undue burden to achieve proportional 
representation by freezing that representation in perpetuity, by establishing a fixed quota 
system, therefore the plan is legitimate. The plans did not transgress any of the statutory 
limitations on the scope of voluntary plans. It doesn't call for layoffs; it doesn't totally 
1190ran's Dictionary of the Law, Daniel Oran, J.D., 1983. 
120Ledoux v District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1987) at 1293. 
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exclude nonminorities from promotions; and it does not establish representation m 
perpetuity. 
The Court of Appeals held that the appellant's did not adequately prove that the 
Department's Plan was invalid under Title VII, and that the District Court did properly 
dismiss the appellants' Title VII claims of reverse discrimination. The court remanded the 
case in order to determine the factual basis of whether the Department had a valid claim 
for believing that affirmative action was prudent and necessary to remedy the present 
effects of past discrimination within the Department. The ultimate burden of proof was 
placed on the appellant. They are required to demonstrate why the affirmative action 
plan was considered to be in violation of their rights afforded under both the Equal 
Protection Clause and Title VII. 121 
Summary 
Case law regarding affirmative action has generally been organized around two 
types of violations: Fourteenth amendment, equal protection clause violations an Title 
VII violations. The major themes associated with the challenges are: strict scrutiny and 
manifest imbalance. The objective of race conscious affirmative action measures is to 
remedy the current effects of past vestiges of discrimination. 122 However, the level of 
proof necessary to substantiate an employer's use of race consideration in employment 
practice differs depending upon whether the challenge is invoked under the auspices of 
121 Ledoux at 1306-07. 
122U.S. Steelworkers of America v Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 199 (1979). 
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either an equal protection clause or Title VII violation. Title VII stipulations were 
adopted in Johnson v Transportation Agency of Santa Clara in 1987. In regard to Title 
VII, the affirmative action plan must be justified by the existence of a "manifest 
imbalance" in a job category traditionally segregated by the under representation of 
women and minorities. 123 Upon demonstration of the manifest imbalance through 
statistical evidence, the Court has the arduous task of considering whether the 
constitutional rights of the discriminatee are :unnecessarily trammeled" by the invocation 
of the affirmative action plan. 124 
In contrast, analysis of an equal protection clause violation is determined using 
the Strict Scrutiny Two Prong Test, which was adopted in 1989 in City of Richmond v 
Croson. 125 The Fourteenth amendment equal protection clause stipulates that States are 
prohibited from enforcing or creating any legislation which denies an individual's equal 
protection rights as afforded by the U.S. Constitution. 126 
The Court decided that judicial scrutiny is utilized in instances in which there is 
clarification needed to determine whether an affirmative action plan is remedial or 
motivated by unfounded notions of racial inferiority. 127 In making this determination, the 
Court developed a two prong test to judge the validity of the plan. The test stipulates that 
123Johnson at 1452. 
124Johnson at 1452. 
125Croson at 469. 
126U.S. Constitution amend. XIV, § 1. 
127 Croson at 469. 
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( 1) the racial classification used in drafting the plan must be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest; and (2) the means chosen by the State must be narrowly tailored 
to remedy the current effects of past vestiges of racial discrimination. 128 
There must be substantial evidence to support the State's determination that 
remedial measures were indeed appropriate and that other alternative measures were 
explored. 129 In making this determination, evidence of gross statistical imbalances with 
regard to minority or gender representation is sufficient to satisfy a Title VII prima facie 
requirement. 130 However, in an equal protection clause challenge, the affirmative action 
plan is required to concurrently satisfy both prongs of the Strict Scrutiny Two Prong test 
in order to survive judicial scrutiny. 131 In both instances, the Supreme Court determined 
that in deciding upon the issues of equal protection clause and/or Title VII violations, the 
ultimate burden of proof is placed upon the parties asserting the claim, the plaintiff. 132 
The next chapter, which is the fourth chapter is the concluding chapter and 
discusses the findings of the study. 
128Wygant at 274. 
129Vogel at 599. 
130Hazelwood at 299. 
131Haze1wood at 299. 
132Wygant at 267, 277-78. 
CHAPTER4 
CONCLUSION 
The scope of affirmative action legislation has never been clearly defined and 
has always been ambiguous both in language and in appropriate design. It was initially 
intended to pacify African Americans during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, 
but was enlarged in scope to include all minorities, women, handicapped, war veterans, 
and the disadvantaged. Civil rights legislation and the enforcement of executive orders 
specifically address discriminatory issues involving employment, education, and housing. 
The purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is to prohibit employment 
discrimination. Congress believed that an individual's livelihood, dignity, and self worth 
were directly related to the availability of equal employment opportunities afforded to the 
individual, regardless of race of gender. This Act constituted an acknowledgment that 
illegal discrimination existed and required remediation. The Act does not require quota 
implementation and preferential treatment for the purpose of correcting racial and/or 
gender imbalances. However, the implementation of quotas and preferential treatment 
are considered constitutional when they are required to remedy persistent discrimination 
practices within public sector employment. The Civil Right Act of 1991 supplements the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, in that it protects nonminorities from having their constitutional 
rights guaranteed under both Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
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Clause adversely impacted by the implementation of affirmative action plans. 
Specifically, the act protects non-minorities m reverse discrimination actions. It 
mandates that all potentially affected parties are required to be afforded the opportunity 
of participation in the consent decree process. 
Affirmative action encompasses almost every facet imaginable with regard to 
ensuring equal opportunity access. It includes among other things, employment 
considerations, higher education, and set aside programs. Critics have deemed that 
affirmative action is "reverse discrimination" and just as prolific as discrimination 
because minorities receive favorable consideration on the basis of their race, irrespective 
of merit. However, affirmative action proponents contend that affirmative action 
programs serve to balance economic and educational distribution opportunities by 
providing incentives and training programs to traditionally disadvantaged members of 
American society. Affirmative action plans serve many purposes and are designed to 
address the specific needs that the protected class members face in trying to achieve 
economic parity. However, most plans address three specific questions. 
The first question addressed within this study concerns the issue of when does 
an employer have the right to practice affirmative action in awarding preferential 
treatment in making employment considerations regarding hiring and promotions? The 
answer to the question with regard to when an employer has the right to practice 
affirmative action in awarding preferential treatment in hiring and promotions has never 
been fully answered by the federal court system. It is an accepted rule of thumb to 
assume that an employer is required to practice affirmative action measures whenever the 
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organization is a government contractor/subcontractor or whenever the court has ordered 
the organization to implement an affirmative action plan due to evidence of past 
discrimination practices currently impacting minorities. 1 
The second question concerns the issue of whether prospective employers are 
being discriminatory if they require prospective employees to take an examination, even 
though there is evidence to support the fact that minorities usually score 
disproportionately lower than their white colleagues? The answer to the question is that 
employers are not acting in a discriminatory manner provided that the testing satisfies the 
terms of the Strict Scrutiny Two Prong Standard. In Vogel v City of Cincinnati, it was 
determined that a governmental entity is authorized to afford preference to qualified 
minorities and women when needed to meet the interim goals of a consent decree. 2 
However, the governmental agency is prohibited from hiring unnecessary personnel or 
unqualified employees for available positions or to satisfy quota requirements. 3 In this 
case, the requirement that an applicant for employment consideration be required to be 
qualified in skill adheres to the provisional requirements of valid consent decrees. 4 There 
are problems with this preferential treatment measure. In some cases, less qualified 
1John A Gray, "Preferential Affirmative Action in Employment," Labor Law 
Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1, January 1992, 25-26 
2Vogel v City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir, 1994) at 597. 
3Vogel at 597. 
4United States v Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987), 150-52. 
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minorities are hired for positions that they are unqualified to possess, merely for the 
purpose of satisfying internal quotas. 
This issue has been at the forefront of controversy, especially in regard to 
promotion examinations given to police and fire applicants. The issue in question is 
"race norming" a applicant's score to compensate for the perceived notion that women 
and minorities score disproportionately lower than non-minorities and Asians due to 
intellectual inferiority. The practice is known as "race norming," which requires adding 
extra points to adjust the scores of minority candidates to reflect a more favorable score. 
Race norming practices were implemented in the l 980's and have reportedly subjected 
hundreds of thousands of unsuspecting applicants to self imposed quota systems. This 
practice was prohibited with the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Restoration Act 5 
The City of Chicago's Police Department implemented a race norming practice 
in 1989. This practice resulted in the department adding extra points to adjust the scores 
of minority candidates sitting for the sergeant's examination. The City of Detroit used 
the practice of separating the scores of African American and white promotion 
candidates. The separated list was then tabulated and ranked from the highest to the 
lowest The two lists were then compared according to rank order. The result of the 
norming techniques precipitated an increase in the hiring and promotion of minorities. 
Prior to the use of the race nonning practice, there was a disproportionate amount of non-
5Paul Glastris, "The Thin White Line," U.S. News & World Report, Vol. 117, 
No. 7, 15 August 1994, 53-54. 
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minorities present in upper ranking positions within the police department across the 
United States. 6 
Even though race norrnmg 1s essentially banned, many government 
municipalities practice a new technique of race norming an applicant's standardized tests 
scores, by practicing a method commonly known as "banding." Banding involves 
concealing differences in academic performance by grouping wide ranges of scores 
together in a lump sum. 7 As a result of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, many police and 
fire department have dismantled their race norming practices with regard to hiring and 
promotions. 
This problem of achieving racial and gender diversity has also proved to be 
problematic for the Clinton and Bush administrations. One of the most prolific being the 
imposition placed on cabinet secretaries and agency directors to utilize preselection 
criteria to select qualified minority and female candidates for departmental positions. In 
some instances, appointments were made despite the availability of better qualified 
applicants, who were neither minority nor female. 8 
The third question concerns the issue of whether termination policies based 
upon seniority are acceptable, if the predominant majority of the senior employees are 
non-minority males? The answer to the question is that termination policies based upon 
6Paul Glastris, "The Thin White Line," U.S. News & World Report, 53-54. 
7Peter Brimelow and Leslie Spencer, "When Quotas Replace Merit, Everybody 
Suffers", Forbes, Vol. 151, No. 4, 15 February 1993, 82. 
8Ruth Shalit, "Unwhite House," The New Republic, Vol. 208, No. 15, 12 April 
1993, 12-14. 
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seniority are acceptable, provided that the seniority system meets all of the requirements 
established under Title VII. According to the majority Supreme Court opinion in 
Firefighters v Stotts, the primary issue concerned whether the District Court exceeded its 
judicial authority when it issued a preliminary injunction that required white employees 
to be laid off when other applicable seniority systems would have called for the layoff of 
less senior African American employees. 9 The Court concluded that the City of 
Memphis didn't consent to be enjoined from making layoffs, which decreased the 
percentage of African American employees. The modification altered the application of 
the seniority system and was held to be outside of the jurisdictional authority of the 
Court. Although the consent decree in this case didn't include retroactive seniority, the 
Court placed a lot of emphasis on the fact that there was no evidence that any African 
American protected from layoffs had been prior victims of discrimination. Therefore, 
there was no award of competitive seniority made to any of them. The Court perceived 
the modification to be an infringement on the vested seniority rights of non-minority 
firefighters. These questions are just the tip of the iceberg. There are many more 
questions which include, but are not limited to answering questions relating to 
discrimination allegations filed by the disabled, people alleging religiously infringement, 
and others. 10 
9Louise Jackson Williams, "Last Hired, First Fired - Rights Without Remedies: 
Firefighters v Stotts", Detroit College of Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 215, 1985, 230. 
10Louise Jackson Williams, "Last Hired, First Fired - Rights Without Remedies: 
Firefighters v Stotts", Detroit College of Law Review, 232. 
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Despite the courts efforts to encourage diversity within the workplace, 
discrimination still exists. The federal court system closely scrutinizes the evidence that 
an employer uses to justify the implementation of voluntary affirmative action programs. 
This is done in order to determine whether the plan is necessary and the remedial 
measures necessary to discourage the perpetuation of past discriminatory practices. The 
Supreme Court bases most of their decisions on the holding of both Croson and Johnson. 
There are four conditions that preclude a legally valid affirmative action plan 
under terms of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. First, the plan must have a 
remedial purpose, designed to eradicate a statistically significant imbalance in 
traditionally segregated job categories; secondly, the plan must be temporary in duration, 
implemented in a manner that is done to attain, but not maintain parity within the work 
force; third, the plan must not impede on non-minority and male opportunities; and 
fourth, the plan must not unnecessarily trammel the rights of others or necessitate the 
replacement of employees currently in place. 
Public sector employers must follow the guidelines set forth under Title VII, as 
well as the guidelines of the Equal Protection Clause, as defined under Croson and 
Johnson. The Supreme Court held in Croson that government classification based on 
race are subject to strictest scrutiny and must satisfy the requirements as set forth under 
the Strict Scrutiny Two Prong Standard. The standard requires the government to 
establish that there is an imbalance by comparing the racial composition and/or gender of 
its work force with that of the local, qualified labor pool; that the government's own past 
discriminatory practices created the imbalance; and that the plan is necessary remedial 
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measure to remedy the imbalance. These requirements were established under the terms 
of the Wygant decision. This decision has come to be associated with the requirement 
that state and local governments are allowed to establish voluntary affirmative action 
plans within their jurisdiction, provided that the plans are designed specifically to remedy 
the present effects of the government's past discriminatory practices. 
Under Croson legislation, state and local governments are prohibited from 
imposing minority set aside requirements on their contractors/subcontractors except in 
instances in which the government is attempting to remedy the present effects of past 
vestiges of the government's own identifiable past discriminatory practices of contracting 
to non-minority firms in the local industry. The Constitutional limits established under 
Wygant and Croson establish that first, state and local governments affirmative action 
plans that utilize racial classifications for employment purposes are subject to strict 
scrutiny; secondly, state and local government may not itself be a voluntary affirmative 
action employer, except to remedy its own identifiable past discriminatory practices; 
third, affirmative action lay-offs are not allowed; and fourth, state and local government 
MBE set asides are not allowed, except to remedy either government's own past 
discriminatory practices or those of the local industry, and then no more than necessary 
to remedy identifiable discrimination. Even though the voluntary affirmative action 
plans are judicially scrutinized, and the fact that there is an ever increasing resentment 
among both minorities and nonminorities regarding the implementation and the need of 
affirmative action plans, the court system continues to support the majority of the 
discrimination claims presented with regard to these policies. The imposition placed on 
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employers to establish goals and timetables for diversifying the workplace is one of the 
only viable means available to ensure that minorities and women are afforded equal 
access to opportunities that they may not have been privileged to had it not been for the 
implementation of these programs. 
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